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Throughout the military skirmishes of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the
political leaders of the United States assured the American public that each
conflict would not be "another Vietnam." Their appeals seemed to be pred
icated on the existence of a fixed image of the Vietnam War.
All historical events are subject to interpretation. For example, running
concurrently with the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of V-J Day
were debates regarding the morality of President Truman's decision to drop
the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One
can reasonably assume that the final interpretation of American military in
tervention in Southeast Asia will also be long in coming. As Doherty com
mented:
Television documentaries, exploitation films, autobiographies, photobooks,
histories linear and oral—after a decade of relative oblivion, the Vietnam
War is back on the national agenda. A rhetorical conflict now, the war is
refought in words and images with history the prize (1985, 3 May, p. 49).
This current essay is an amalgamation, a bringing together of various ac
ademic and nonacademic texts which contain opposing interpretations of
the Vietnam War. After examining these rhetorical artifacts, one could safely
characterize the American approach to assimilating the events of the Vietnam
War as something analogous to a multiple personality disorder. One enclave
encompasses those who are afflicted with "collective amnesia," people who
wish to permanently consign the war to oblivion (Clark et al, 1987, p. 326).
A second group, the historical revisionists, is actively engaged in a renewed
analysis and explication of historical facts. The third and final group is com
prised of various Administration rhetors who have reworked the meaning of
"Vietnam" to suit their immediate political exigencies.
/. The Amnesia Thesis
Speaking in general terms, Americans do not want to remember the Vi
etnam War; they "have tried to bury the mistakes of Vietnam and have
stopped looking for lessons" (Coming home, 1983, p. 196). Herring (1984)
reminds us that the Vietnam War was one of the most divisive events ex
perienced by Americans since the Civil War. Yet, in comparison to World
War II, only a small percentage of the American population had any direct
connection with the war's prosecution. For many people in the United States,
life went on after the war much as it had gone on before the war.
Unlike the nostalgia surrounding the events of World War II, there is no
longing among Americans for any introspection or analysis of the Vietnam
era. Herring writes: "Most Americans have little desire to discuss it, even to
recall it. It is an episode from the past well-forgotten" (1984, p. 217). Early
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in the 1992 presidential primary, a Democratic strategist noted, "If you offer
a plate filled with Vietnam memories, people are going to push that plate
away and look for something else. It's the last thing they want to think about"
(Lawrence, 1992, February 13, p. 1A).
Not only is the citizenry afflicted with amnesia concerning Vietnam, but
the leadership as well. This fact is readily apparent when one reflects on the
years of the Reagan Administration. There are those who argue that Reagan's
popularity and his "Teflon-like ability to remain impervious to criticism"
were based on his talent for giving American voters what they want, i.e., "a
leader who affirms not only that this country is not now sick, but that it never
was" (Becker, 1985, May 25, p. 561). Former President George Bush (1990)
demonstrated in his 1989 inaugural address that he too was not interested
in rousing the public to consciousness regarding Vietnam:
That war cleaves us still. But, friends, that war began in earnest a quarter of
a century ago, and surely the statute of limitations has been reached. This is
a fact: The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to
be sundered by a memory (p. 3).
In recounting his tour of Central America in the mid-1980s, director Oliver
Stone (1988) remarks that he was taken aback by the distinct similarities
between Central America of the 1980s and South Vietnam of the 1960s. The
young American troops stationed in Honduras exhibited the same "gung-ho"
attitude of their predecessors in Vietnam; they were there to "save" Central
America from Communist aggression. Stone writes of the puzzled and enig
matic expressions on the soldiers' faces when he questioned them about
Vietnam. Stone charges that the current generation is afflicted with a "moral
amnesia" because
the guys who run the country don't remember Vietnam! They don't remember
what war means, in terms of suffering, to the body and the soul. The power
of forgetting, I have found out, is not to be underestimated—ever (p. 425).
There are three possible explanations for this cultural amnesia concerning
Vietnam. First, the American collective consciousness is reacting to a trauma.
The events of the Vietnam War demonstrated the weaknesses of the Ameri
can system, and so they represent a threat to the core assumptions of strength
and moral superiority Americans have long cherished. Like a victim of a
violent assault who claims to have no memories of the attack, the American
collective consciousness is in the process of repression and denial. In order
to be psychologically healed, a victim of a violent act must remember and
accept those memories. "But we are speaking of a nation and its denial of
traumatic news about itself," Becker writes. "Hence moving beyond denial
is far more difficult and complex" (1985, May 25, p. 561).
The second possible explanation for the collective amnesia is that the Vi
etnam War was and still is too much of an abstraction for many Americans.
As Roche (1985, May 3) notes, Americans fought in Southeast Asia for "the
freedom of a bunch of unfamiliar Asians at the end of the world" (Roche,
1985, May 3, p. 44). How can Americans remember and analyze an event
they never understood fully in the first place? The answer may lie in the
Burke's concept of consubstantiality. Americans operate with a construct, a
model of what "good, decent, loyal Americans" should look and act like. In
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picking and choosing allies, Americans compare and contrast the peoples of
other nations with the "good, decent, loyal American" construct. The closer
the other culture is to the American model, the greater the possibility that
those people will be accepted as an ally. One can foresee the difficulties for
Americans in aligning themselves with an Asian culture. Americans never
fully accepted the South Vietnamese as an ally because they were "geo
graphically, ideologically, religiously, culturally, and perhaps most important,
racially not consubstantial with us" (Brummett, 1989, p. 146). Thus, Amer
icans were never emotionally or psychologically attached to the Vietnam
War. They lack the motivation to appraise and comprehend wholly an his
torical event they never cared about in the first place.
The third possible explanation for collective amnesia is political expedi
ency. Ehrenhaus (1989) posits that the cessation of a war brings with it the
commitment to remember. The wartime events are absorbed into the larger
cultural narrative and used to legitimate the social and political institutions.
The ceremonies commemorating the end of a war maintain
the legitimacy of purpose for which a community has issued its call for sac
rifice; it further endows meaning to the sacrifices of those who fought and
died. Moreover, remembrances reaffirm the hierarchical relationships and
obligations of each individual to the larger political community, reminding
all of the responsibilities and obligations of each to the other (p. 97).
Those at the top of the hierarchy are empowered with the authority to shape
the substance of the larger cultural narrative. In order to possess the requisite
moral authority, this narrative must be free of complexity and contradiction.
The events of the Vietnam War are rife with complexity and contradiction.
Thus, Ehrenhaus posits, to commemorate the Vietnam War brings with it the
remembrance of its ethical and political conundrums, which ultimately lead
to questioning the legitimacy our civilian and military leadership. In order
to avoid such questioning, the Vietnam War narrative must never achieve
closure.
II. The Historical Revisionism Thesis
There is no fixed or stable image of the Vietnam War for a second reason:
The process of writing the history of the Vietnam War has not yet run its full
course. Twentieth-century American diplomatic history. Divine (1988) writes,
follows a specific cycle of analysis after each significant confrontation. This
analysis runs from "contemporary support through a critical revision and
finally culminates in a synthesis that incorporates elements of both earlier
views" (p. 79). The pattern following the Vietnam War is slightly skewered.
The initial scholarship was highly critical of American foreign policy. The
second stage, the period of revisionism, runs from the late 1970s to early
1980s. This period of the historiographic cycle produced an analysis which
has been highly supportive of a American involvement in Southeast Asia.
This period of Vietnam revisionism
reflected a growing conservative mood in the United States, symbolized by
the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, and a belated national effort to come
to grips with the Vietnam experience .. . Rejecting the prevailing view that
the Vietnam War was an unmitigated evil, revisionists defended and justified
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American involvement. . . . There is still considerable disagreement among
these writers on many points, but they share a common desire to treat the
American effort in Vietnam more sympathetically than earlier historians (pp.
84-5).
The third stage of the cycle runs from the mid 1980s to the present day.
Diplomatic history written in this final stage is a synthesis of both the critical
and revisionist views.
Despite the ongoing efforts of historians, some argue that their efforts will
be of little consequence. Paterson (1988) writes that Americans are "noto
riously lacking in an informed historical consciousness, and they shun close
historical analysis." Errors are soon forgotten, treated as "mere aberrations
in the march of progress" (p. 1). Fromkin and Chace (1985) argue that no
lessons will ever be learned from the Vietnam experience because there will
never be an agreement on what actually happened. Appealing to the "les
sons of Vietnam" when constructing foreign policy positions on the Middle
East and Central America do more to confuse than to clarify. They conclude;
"If we could all look at that terrible experience through the same pair of
eyes, it could teach us much. But we cannot, so it cannot. That may be the
final tragedy of the Vietnam War" (p. 746).
III. Administration Rhetors
The Vietnam War has no fixed image or stable meaning for a final reason:
various Administration rhetors have reshaped the image and redefined the
meaning to suit their conceptions of the conflict.
Extension of the American Frontier Myth—Gustainis (1989) writes that
President Kennedy's solution to the exigence of worldwide Communist ag
gression through "wars of national liberation" was counterinsurgency. Ken
nedy's task was to sell his solution—i.e., to present this same exigence rhe
torically—to those audiences whose support he needed to carry out his plan:
Congress, senior military officials, and the American people. Kennedy and
his public relations minions mounted a public relations campaign that pre
sented the abstract concept of counterinsurgency in a more concrete form.
The PR. campaign used a mythical symbol from American popular culture,
the frontiersman, and portrayed the Green Berets, at the time a little known
U.S. Army commando force, as the more updated version. The Green Beret
myth proved to be a successful rhetorical appeal. The news media were sold
on the image, so much so that with America moving closer to war in South
Vietnam the press was not asking many questions concerning the wisdom of
Kennedy's interventionist foreign policy. The Green Beret myth may also have
inspired many young men to join the Army, but senior military officials were
not completely supportive of the counterinsurgency program. When Lyndon
Johnson came to power, he was told by the Pentagon brass that Kennedy's
Vietnam strategy had failed and more conventional methods of waging war
were necessary.
The frontier myth may not have been successful as foreign policy, but it is
the dominant narrative framework used in more recent and successful film
depictions of the Vietnam War. Schechter and Semeiks (1991) write that the
Hollywood establishment was extremely apprehensive about producing films
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"using Vietnam as a metaphor for Something Significant." The Deer Hunter
and Apocalypse Now, both produced in the late 1970s, were notable ex
ceptions. In general, "cinematic depictions of America's most unpopular war
were regarded as box-office poison" (p. 17). In the 1980s, that situation
changed substantially with the release of Rambo and Platoon. Though Ram-
bo is a "comic-book fantasy" and Platoon "quasi-documentary," both owe
their success to their reshaping of the Vietnam War to fit the format of the
archetypal American frontier hero myth. This singularly American version of
the classic hero myth serves as the prevalent theme in many works of Amer
ican popular fiction and focuses on "civilized heroes who undergo a deep
inner transformation through their descent into a terrifyingly savage wilder
ness" (pp. 19-20).
In addition to following a classic American formula, there is another rea
son for the success of Rambo not mentioned by Schechter and Semeiks. This
film spends little time muddling over political abstractions, though its polit
ical leanings are readily apparent. Rambo compresses a library's worth of
scholarly discourse into an elementary narrative. The villains are plainly ob
vious—the Vietnamese and their Russian puppetmasters, and corrupt Wash
ington bureaucrats.
Containment Vessel—A second image of Vietnam forwarded by Admin
istration rhetors was that of Vietnam as a containment vessel, one in which
the United States would "bottle up" the advance of Communism. Ivie (1989)
writes that Lyndon Johnson's choice of a master metaphor of containment to
describe and justify his Vietnam policy was contradicted by other key terms
also employed by the Administration—i.e., birth, risk-taking, strength, and
savagery. The Johnson Administration attempted unsuccessfully to match a
moderate foreign policy to fit its strong rhetorical appeals. Several attempts
were made to introduce alternate metaphors or images to describe the sit
uation in South Vietnam. One which had great potential was the "pro-free
dom birth" metaphor in which South Vietnam was a non-communist nation
laboring to be born. The South Vietnamese government may not have fit the
American model of democracy, but the "pro-freedom birth" metaphor would
have allowed for some discrepancies; one cannot expect democratically ma
ture actions from a "nation-child." However, the Johnson Administration
continued to rely on the containment metaphor to explain why military in
tervention in Southeast Asia was in the national interest of the United States.
Ivie writes that this rhetorical strategy presented the administration with sev
eral problems:
The national interest was defined negatively and indirectly, thus engaging the
cause of freedom ambiguously; the enemy was the entire communist world,
thus risking an unthinkable third world war in order to achieve some kind
of a victory; and the rest of the administrations's rhetoric was constrained
accordingly—projecting a confused image of firmness modified by softness,
risk-taking without the promise of a clear reward, and savagery without the
full satisfaction of victimage" (pp. 138-39).
By choosing a different "God term," Ivie suggests Johnson could have avoid
ed the above mentioned difficulties.
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Quest Story—Nixon's contribution to the images of Vietnam comes from
a traditional literary genre—the quest story. In an analysis of Nixon's Vietnam
rhetoric, Stelzner (1971) writes that all of the traditional elements of a quest
story are present in Nixon's November 3, 1969 address to the nation: a
precious object or person, a long journey, a hero, guardians of the object,
helpers.
Despite the presence of the essential ingredients, in the final analysis, how
ever, Nixon's speech is not a good quest story. A quest suggests great mo
ments and great risks. Nixon's political narrative contains none of these.
There is no ultimate conflict between Nixon as hero and the North Vietnam
ese, the guardians of the precious object of peace. Instead, Nixon confronts
and challenges American youth, a possible constituency who could be po
tential helpers, choosing to destroy their arguments instead of North Viet
nam's. Nixon's language is flat and unimaginative, devoid of Biblical imagery.
Nixon wanted to keep the war secular and contained. Biblical imagery
would be too grand for use in justifying a limited war and might even invite
an ethical judgment of the president's policy, giving the opposition a possible
issue.
These fundamental flaws may be of importance to a literary critic, Stelzner
writes, but Nixon's purpose was not to create a great literary text. His Viet-
namization speech had practical ends. First, Nixon gained an audience, the
Silent Majority, a group of indeterminate size who responded to his imagery.
Second, Nixon gained time to prepare for next series of foriegn policy grow
ing out of Vietnam.
Noble Cause—The final image or meaning Administration rhetors have tried
to affix to Vietnam is that of the Noble Cause. The image figures as a central
feature of former Secretary of State George Shultz's (1985, June) speech "The
Meaning of Vietnam." In their critical analysis of this address, Dionisopoulos
and Goldzwig (1992) argue that Schultz's speech represented the Reagan Ad
ministration's attempt to revise the history of American involvement in Vietnam
in order to make it useable in justifying its Central American policies. Amer
icans view history as a narrative containing "object lessons" and "historical
truths." When we seek to legitimate our current policies, we look to the past
and see those events as analogous to current conditions; therefore, what
worked then will work now. The Reagan Administration was finding it difficult
to justify American intervention in Central America because of the "lessons"
of Vietnam. It was necessary for them to "revise" history.
In this speech, Shultz placed himself in the position of a cultural historian,
one who was offering the public a revised historical narrative. Dionisopoulos
and Goldzwig argue that Shultz followed a three-part strategy in his process
of historical revisionism. First, Shultz used the tenth anniversary of the fall
of Vietnam as justification to reexamine the past—the passage of time al
lowed for a more dispassionate and objective look at past events.
Second, Shultz offered a retrospective view of events in Southeast Asia
since 1975. After describing the atrocities suffered by the people of Vietnam,
Shultz presents a new perspective from which to see the past, removing the
received view. He chose the Noble Cause theory. The inhumanity of the
Communists was exactly what America's Vietnam policies were attempting
10
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to prevent. The execution of those policies may have been less than faultless,
Shultz acknowledged, but "the morality of our effort must now be clear. . .
our sacrifice was in the service of noble ideals—to save innocent people
from brutal tyranny" (p. 14).
Third, Shultz shifts his attention to Central America and applies the lessons
of the revised history to current events. Central America is another South
Vietnam, but that stance cannot be used as an attack against Reagan Ad
ministration policy. The goals of the United States in South Vietnam were
noble ones—"democracy, economic progress, and security against aggres
sion." The same goals apply to Central America. The programs for imple
menting those goals, for "nurturing the forces of democracy," have been
working without the need for American combat units. "And by virtue of
simple geography, there can be no conceivable doubt that Central America
is vital to our own security" (p. 15).
IV. Conclusion
When one speaks of the "lessons of Vietnam," one is speaking of a very
rhetorical construct. Vietnam has no fixed image or stable meaning. In this
essay I have outlined three possible reasons.
First, America is suffering from a "collective amnesia." The events of the
war are so painful and traumatic that much like the victim of a violent assault
we are blocking or repressing our Vietnam memories. The amnesia may not
be due to trauma, but due to a conscious decision to forget what we did not
fully understand at the beginning. Perhaps our amnesia is a matter of political
expediency; to remember Vietnam would call into question the authority of
our civilian and military leadership.
Second, there is no fixed image or stable meaning to Vietnam because the
"final" or "complete" history has yet to be written. Following the war, his
torians wrote a history of Vietnam that was critical of American policies. In
the 1980s, the history being written was very supportive of those same pol
icies. Currently, historians are writing a history of the Vietnam War which
combines elements of the two earlier views.
Finally, there is no fixed image or stable meaning to Vietnam because
various Administration rhetors have reshaped the image and redefined the
meaning to fit their conceptions of the war. Kennedy described Vietnam as
an mythical extension of America's frontier. The containment metaphor
served as the Johnson Administration's template in formulating a rhetoric that
described Vietnam as a vessel to hold the forces of Communism in check.
Nixon borrowed from a traditional literary form, the quest story, in describing
his policy of Vietnamization. Reagan Administration officials reworked the
history of Vietnam in order to use it as a justification for the Central American
policy needs.
The question remains: Will there ever be a fixed image or stable meaning
of the Vietnam War? Inevitably, yes, there will be. The combined elements
of collective amnesia and historical revisionism along with the alchemical
incantations of future Administration rhetors will ultimately produce a vision
of the Vietnam War, a somewhat more insipid and diaphanous version of
the original event. Necessity dictates that if we are to be active participants
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in the New World Order, then we truly cannot afford to be "sundered by a
memory."
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My fear is that one day 1 will wake up and it will be a different world. I
look back on history and this is pretty much what I see: one day a person
goes to sleep in the Roman Empire, the most powerful empire in the world
to that point, and the next day wakes up and is in the midst of a barbarous
anarchy. It is not so much that I fear that our institutions will disband and
we will be left to live on nuts and berries. It is only that I can understand
how such a thing could occur. Even within our beloved debate we sense the
potential. One day you go to bed and most of the judges are policymakers
and all of the rules seem pretty clear. The next day, you get up and the world
seems to be thrown into an anarchy where paradigms are dismissed as his
torical oddities and everyone feels free to reinvent debate for themselves in
any way that seems expedient. The thought is a little terrifying: that our game
could get out of our own control. But it may be misplaced.
If recent thoughts on the nature of debate are any sort of judge, the sense
of impending anarchy seems to be peculiarly felt in regard to questions of
fiat and especially in regard to questions of negative fiat.' What is interesting
about these musings on the nature of fiat is how despite their radically in
dependent perspectives, each senses the same problem. "In what way can
we limit the negative's counterplan ground?" Or, "how is it we can better
facilitate discussions of the resolution?" Each of them feel that the debate
discussions are unfocused and that they often seem to reward negatives for
unreasonable or Utopian strategies at the expense of a reasonable and sincere
discussion of the affirmative case or the "affirmative resolution."
Well, responses to anarchy have been consistent across the ages; to fore
stall anarchy we must install discipline. However, debate has notoriously
resisted disciplining. One of academic debate's ironic qualities is that the
activity is constituted in resisting any type of dogmatic discipline. The key
question for those who want to stop debate anarchy, then, seems to be one
that regards implementation more than ends: "how do we get people to play
' Gordon Mitchell. "Time for an Activist Outward Turn in Academic Debate, Roger
Solt, ed. Debater's Research Guide 1995: United Staes Foreign Policy: China Cards
(Winston-Salem, NC: Wake Forest University, 1995): A4-A7; Alan Coverstone. "An
Inward Glance: A Response to Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," Debater's Research
Guide 1995: A7-A10; Doyle Srader. "Fiat as Parameter: Facilitating Discusion by
Excusing Non-germane Issues," Paper presented at the 1995 SCA Convention, San
Antonio, TX, 1995; Jon Sharp and Michael Hester. "Fiat from a Resolutional Perspec
tive," Paper presentated at the 1995 SCA Convention, San Antonio, TX, 1995; Marcia
Tiersky. "International Fiat: A Moderate Proposal," Paper presentated at the 1995 SCA
Convention, San Antonio, TX, 1995.
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by the rules?" The resolution to this question demands both a discussion of
the ends of debate and the means by which we reach them. Here I will look
at debates about the scope of fiat in terms of their construction of the prob
lem of fiat in academic debate and will end by suggesting an alternative
conception of debate.
One strategy that is common to most discussions of fiat is to attempt to
use a variety of social compact to discipline users of negative fiat. In both
cases theorists suggest that problems stem from the lack of a structural dis
tinction between what is legitimate and illegitimate. The solution, therefore,
demands a more militant defense of the resolution's fragile borders.
How do we know where the borders are? How does anyone find their
borders? For most fiat theorists, fiat's borders seem to exist somewhere in the
no-persons land between legitimate international actors and illegitimate per
sonal action. The sextant that we use to identify the specific border lies,
however, with some sense of what constitutes "good debate." For each the
orist the decision on where the border lies is part of the compact that makes
the game of debate possible. Just as time limits, the forced decision of a
neutral judge, and the right to rebuttal, fiat takes the form of a constitutive
rule of the game. There could be many possible rules to the game, chosen
on the basis of their ability to create a game that is fun or useful to play.
Most discussions of fiat are constituted in suggestions regarding their own
versions of the three point line or designated hitter. They just happen to be
in regard to our perception of what makes a good debate rather than an
interesting basketball or baseball game.
Embedded deep within the substrata of these types of argument and almost
unseen, lies a metaphoric structure which makes the activity meaningful—
debate is a game. At no time do these theorists talk about debate as a game
or advocate that we should look at debate as a game that has useful spin-
offs. They take the debate-game equation as such a given that they do not
even have to overtly acknowledge it.^
It is at this point of debate's hypotheticalness that Gordon Mitchell's ob
servations on the utility of the game become important. He is interested in
the effects of the game, and most interested in the ways that we can assess
the utility of the game by external means. For Mitchell, the stakes are high.
Rather than seeking to create a game that is interesting or fun or has a large
audience or complies with some sense of consistency of logic, Mitchell is
most interesting in creating a game that instills in its practitioners a sense of
power and responsibility. He questions the utility of a game where partici
pants role-play for the sake of the game and then retire later in the day to
lives that are completely alien to their advocacy. Mitchell seems especially
concerned for the sincerity of players' performances. His solution is to reward
^ For an extended discussion of the debate-game equation, see Charles Arthur Wil-
lard. "The Nature and Implications of the 'Policy Perspective' for the Evaluation of
Debate," David Thomas, ed. Advanced Debate (Skokie IL: National Textbook Com
pany, 1979): 438-444; Alfred C. Snider. "Games without Frontiers: A Design for Com
munication Scholars and Forensic Educators," Journal of the American Forensic As
sociation 20 (1984): 76-88; Stephen Wood. "Normative Expectations and Codified
Rules: Problems in judging Academic/Competitive Debate." CEDA Yearbook 13
(1992): 70-82.
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sincerity and activity and to allow players to integrate their own action in
the world as a conceivable solution to problems. In simplistic terms, he is in
favor of a loop-hole in the fiat rules that would allow individuals to propose
their own action, so long as their proposals were sincere. In other venues
he has coined the term "action plan" to get at the empowering principles
that undergird his hybrid of hypothetical and actual political action in debate.
Mitchell's concern for the ends of the game, even his acknowledgment of
a standard by which we could judge worthy ends, is intriguing. Whereas the
other theorists absent the issue of ends in favor of a discussion of the debate
as an end in itself, Mitchell is willing to engage the ends of debate as a
product of the debates themselves. However, even in unmasking debate's
ends, he continues to employ the game-debate equation; debate continues
as it currently does. Fiat is limited by the no-persons' land that separates
legitimate international actors and illegitimate individuals, except where the
individual sincerely suggests their own action as a solution.
The vision of fiat as rule-governed is firmly rooted in a vision of debate as
a game. The debate-game equation is something that has become particu
larly powerful during the last half of this century. A variety of factors help to
explain the equation's rise and continuing utility.
One Story of Debate and Fiat
Charles Arthur Willard wrote in 1976:
Academic debate is a game in the most rigorous sense of the term. Com
peting teams seek favorable decisions from the neutral judges through the
use of oral argument. The argumentation occurs in an artificial context which
is defined by certain rules and traditions designed to enhance the educational
benefits of the game. In theory, the game teaches research skills, rhetorical
criticism, resource evaluation, and oral delivery skills. These skills are theo
retically sharpened as the disputants are forced to operate within the param
eters of the game's rules—rules which are brought into practical application
by the critic.^
Was debate always a game? True, players have, from near the begining, vied
for points and wins, trophies, hardware, national standings and recognition.
They are coached and play for the glory of their school. But, are these the
ends of debate, or ends to a game, or both? To understand how points, and
trophies, and strategy, and glory became central to debate it is first necessary
to understand where debate came from and where it has been going.
One night, in the early 1960s, debate coaches went to bed in a world
where all of the rules seemed to be clear and woke up the next morning in
debate anarchy. However, as most anarchies, the change was not immedi
ately apparent. Instead, it occurred over several years and seemed to be
backed by the best of intentions and the most rational of arguments.
If you had read a justification for supporting debate in the immediate post
war period, it would probably have had very little to do with teaching ar
gument or even principles of persuasion. Instead, it located its primary func
tion in less abstract concerns. For example, A. Craig Baird laid out this pri
mary justification for studying debate:
^Willard, 1979: 439.
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At the bottom yours is government by talk. Literally, it is government by
argumentation, discussion, and debate. As one educator put it, " we can no
more dispense with legislative and forensic debating in a democratic society
than we can take a walk to the moon . . . The surest way to throw ourselves
into the hands of a dictator is to outlaw debate.""
Balrd goes on to isolate other valuable justifications for academic debate,
but the democratic function is the most important. Now, it is easy to become
confused at this point. We are so inundated with the concept that debate is
a game that we could read Baird as just another attempt to explain why
playing the game is a useful exercise. However, Baird does not ever talk
about debate as a game. In fact, the game idea would probably be alien to
his justifications for debate. For him our government is one of "talk." Debate
and government are the very same thing. Debate is not a means to some
other end. Instead, it is the end.
This initial construction of debate as an end in itself is interesting when
viewed against the Social Compact position that the ends of the debate are
the debate itself, and Mitchell's concept of the end of debate lying in some
kind of political empowerment. For Baird, there is a bit of both positions.
The act of participant in the game is an act of empowerment. There is no
hypothetical or sophistic intermediary.
How did we move from this idealistic and empowering vision of debate
to the game metaphor. It did not happen overnight. Instead, it is a product
of economic, political, and theoretical changes.
In 1963, Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede published Decision by
Debate. The book offered as its unique addition to a bloated academic mar
ket a vision of debate as an investigative exercise. In his editor's introduction
to the book, Karl Wallace wrote:
The authors, in my opinion, have not written merely another book in argu
mentation and debate. They see clearly that debate is an instrument of critical
thought, that it requires its practitioners to think reflectively and calls upon
the audience as judge to weigh and consider. Its methods are self-critical
and self-correcting of error because the form of debate demands that con
tending ideas be systematically examined. Indeed, the habit of the debater
is no less self-critical and self-regulative than the habit of the scientist. Both
expect and invite rigorous judgment from their fellows.^
The scientific method of debate, proposed by Ehninger and Brockreide, was
rooted in the very latest work by Stephen Toulmin. By applying the Toulmin
model to academic debate, the two helped to transform debate from a dem
ocratic exercise into an investigative one.*" Armed with an abstract model of
argument, debate moved from a context-driven exercise into a body of atem-
poral knowledge. Debate's decontextualization mirrored the move of debate
coaches from the fringes of adjunct-driven extracurricular employees to the
tenure-tracked center of the emerging discipline of Speech Communication.
" A. Craig Baird. Argumentation, Discussion and Debate (New York: McCraw Hill,
1950): 4.
® Karl Wallace cited in Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede. Decision by De
bate (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1963): v.
•■James Golden, Goodwin Berquist, ana William Coleman. The Rhetoric of Western
Thought 4th ed. (Dubuque, lA: Kendall/Hunt, 1989): 353.
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Integration of the scientific method and debate through the Toulmin model
had other effects. It facilitated debate's move from context-driven political
action to a hypothetical game. Just as the Roman sophists used historical
topics for their debates in an effort avoid impolitic debate topics, the inves
tigative model helped turn academic debate to a hypothetical rather than
political enterprise.
The application of the scientific method to debate is not the only force
behind the move to depoliticize debate and to institute debate as a hypo
thetical game. There were other forces afoot. In 1954 the debate topic was
that "the United States should extend diplomatic recognition to the Com
munist government of China." While this topic would seem to be as abstract
as the recent high school topic, it was not. Many schools, including the
military academies, refused to debate the topic and there were plenty of
stories of winning affirmative teams being reported to the government for
anti-American activities. The politicization of a debate topic created a market
for a less political, and more abstract, justification for debate. For, if debate
is simply a hypothetical exercise in argument study, then it has no overt
political content. This same contest between debate as a political activity
and debate as the study of argument has periodically raged since. During
the 1991-92 N.D.T. season arguments raged about whether it was appro
priate for judges to refuse to judge cases that sought to limit abortion rights.'
In both the China and the abortion instances, a quick use of the scientific
instead of the political rationale proved a handy defense to ideological pres
sure.
These pressures have changed the way that we argue about debate and
the means that we use to reach our ends. However, while there have been
changes that have altered our conception of debate, my argument is that we
hold on to our old baggage. Most debaters and educators have never really
embraced debate as a hypothetical game that seeks only to test knowledge.
Instead, our practice reflects a different agenda and, deep down, every di
rector of forensics has felt the need to justify debate as creating empowered
citizens and taken pride in the fact that debate students tend to feel more
politically active and able than others. While Gordon Mitchell believes that
the age of empowered students has passed, I believe that it is still with us
and is deeply embedded in the way that we think about debate.
The Roots of Affirmative Fiat
N.D.T. Debate, high school policy debate, and even recent propositions
of policy by C.E.D.A. debate have all taken the United States federal gov
ernment as their actor. How can we explain this consistency of phrasing?
Certainly, the United States is not the only actor in the world? The reason
' Cecelia Graves and David Cheshier. "Forum: Objectivity, Convention, and Fair
Warning: judging Philosophies and Prior Judgment," The Policy Caucus Newsletter!
(November 1991): 3-5.
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lies with one of the elements that make clash possible; the existence of a
relevant frame of reference.®
In order for a debate to have clash, there needs to be some point at which
the affirmative and negative have an overlapping concern for the topic. In
Roman times this common point would be called the stasis of the argument.
In regard to debates over propositions of policy, this overlap is most easily
ensured by having the affirmative argue from a mutual constitution. By the
term "mutual constitution" I mean that the actor of the resolution is in some
way constituted by the two teams in the debate; that all of the parties to the
debate help to make up the actor.
The parties to a debate are only constitutive members of a finite number
of acting organizations. They are usually constitutive elements of the United
States government in that it is a democracy where they have some say about
the actions of the government which are only authorized by the assent of a
majority. Parties to a debate are also constitutive elements of the states where
they live, the organizations that they have in common (most students belong
to university communities), treaty organization such as N.A.T.O. or the U.N.
that count the United States as a member, or members of states. In each
constitutive organization they are members with standing. They have the
ability to speak and their voices are important to the legitimation and func
tioning of these organizations.
It seems to me that this has been an assumption in our construction of
topics. The affirmative should advocate change where they have the ability,
standing, and the right to make changes, in fact, our construction of reso
lutions has been so constrained that there would be some kind of visceral
reaction to any attempt to debate a policy resolution that did not include a
constituted actor. For example, it would be inconceivable for us to debate
the topic that Japan or that some Non Governmental Organization should
change their policy toward the People's Republic of China. It may be true
that japan or the N.G.O.s should change their policy—but we would never
debate it because we have no influence or relation with those actors. This
inherent limitation is the heritage of our pre-argument debate history.
Questions about Negative Fiat
The fact that affirmatives tend to view constitutive agents as legitimate
topics of debate is something that is firmly established. Despite the fact that
many advocates of kritiks have questioned affirmative fiat to make the point
that debate is no more than a hypothetical argumentative game, no negative
would deny the affirmative's obligation to defend constitutive action. What
lacks a firm foundation, however, has been the idea of a negative fiat. While
most judges now accept competitive counterplans as legitimate alternatives
to the affirmative actor, there seems to be little agreement as to the scope of
the competitive action that judges can evaluate. As other papers on the topic
illustrate, many debaters and coaches are frustrated by the seemingly bot-
® The only exceptions that I have found are some high school topics from the 1930s
and 1940s that use "the several states" or "every able-bodied male" as their agents
of action. As 1 shall demonstrate later, even these agents are constitutive of the pop
ulation that debated the topics.
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tomless list of potential negative actors and the tendency for this situation to
leave debates unfocused and unfairly tilted against the affirmative. Negatives
usually respond to such attacks by pointing that affirmatives still win a ma
jority of the debates. But, when has equity had anything to do with justice?
The most useful out-of-round public discussion of this problem occurred
at the 1982 Central States Speech Communication Association Convention
when Robert Gass and Walter Ulrich each offered a substantive discussion
of fiat.
Ulrich argued that because the agreed upon resolution specifies an agent
that it should provide the bounds for legitimate fiat. The judge should take
the role of the agent of the resolution and this assumption should limit the
discussion to things that the agent of the resolution could legitimately ac
complish. This view of fiat has the effect of limiting negative fiat to actions
that are reciprocal with the affirmative.' Ulrich identified three benefits to
this proposal: first, it would make debates more "real world;" second, it
would prevent obscure debates on the exact limits of fiat power, preventing
people from fiating that good people act nice and that SOx become good
for the environment; and third, it would prevent debates from degenerating
into debates about the minor differences between different actors.
Robert Gass took Ulrich to task for each of his promises. In the place of
the reciprocal action fiat, Gass suggested some guidelines for the use of
negative fiat. Gass argued that fiat should be limited to what could be im
plemented or adopted, that it should use normal democratic processes, and
that it should be constrained by the affirmative's identification of inherent
barriers."
If current debate practice is a guide, then neither suggestion had a revo
lutionary impact. They are, however, useful as guides to the logic of fiat as
we have inherited it. They reflect the same ideology as the companion pieces
here: the solution to fiat anarchy is the imposition of more finely tuned dis
cipline. What is most interesting in all of this are the attempts to get at the
logic of what is a legitimate debate. Both Gass and Ulrich wish to limit the
discussions to a finite number of actors and have some sense that it should
be the United States Government. Both see something in the internal logic
of the debate to suggest that this can be done. Ulrich sees the solution in
placing the judge as the agent of action and Gass sees it in the imposition
of guides for fiat use. However, both of these suggestions begin with the
premise that debate is a game. They try to determine the outcome of the
game by playing with the rules to make it a more or less productive discus
sion.
Gass' idea that discussion should be limited to democratic processes is
most interesting here. If debate is an exercise in constitutive action, then the
democratic principles seem to be embedded even here. To this end, Gass
only offers this justification:
' Walter Ulrich. "Limitations on the Options Avaiable to the evaluator of Policy,"
Paper Presented to the Central States Speech Communication Association Convention,
Milwaukee, Wl, April 1982.
Robert Gass, "On Fiat Power," Paper Presented to the Central States Speech Com
munication Association Convention, Milwaukee, Wl, April 1982.
19
et al.: Volume 33, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1995/Winter 1996/Spring 1996/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
16 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
Such channels of action, I believe, constitute a legitimate domain for the
exercise of fiat power. These are the mechanisms and processes that give rise
to, or prevent the solution of, problems in the status quo. These are also the
avenues of change open to real-world policymakers. To allow debaters to
transcend normal democratic processes is to invite comparisons based on a
double standard: that of the real vs. the ideal."
In debate practice this norm has usually taken the form of a cryptic statement
that the plan will be enacted through "normal democratic means." What is
troubling here is that Gass warrants his suggested rule through little more
than his own belief about what is legitimate and some suggestion that debate
would be unfair if we were to break the world into "real" and "unreal"
suggestions. However, even his suggested fiat is admittedly unreal. It relies
upon a vision of debate grounded in hypothetical. The judge acts as a pol
icymaker—the judge is r7ot the policymaker.
As Gordon Mitchell claims, we can have an empowering policy debate
that teaches about and utilizes our constitutive agent. The solution does not
lie, however, in increasing rewards for personal action, nor in sharpening
the compact that governs debate. Instead, it may be found in some return to
the logic that has undergirded and justified debate in the United States for
more than two hundred years: a vision of debate as a type of critical practice.
Rhetoricians Take the Field
In recent years most disciplines have problematized their language. The
Project on the Rhetoric of Inquiry at the University of Iowa, for example,
represents one of many movements to understand the role of language in
constituting academic disciplines. It is not surprising, then, that academic
debate, which is populated by more than its share of rhetorical critics, has
not been immune to "linguistic turn." Through the proliferation of kritik-type
arguments, most of policy debate has become aware of the implications of
the language that we use in our advocacy.
However, the full force of kritik arguments has been blunted by the very
ideas that have allowed them to prosper. Initially, many kritik impacts gained
their weight from the hypothetical nature of the game. The thought was that
if the role of the game was to teach people to be better arguers, then what
better venue could there be than a debate round to punish or reward one's
advocacy skills.
In addition to increasing debaters' appreciation for their language, kritiks
have allowed debaters to unmask our utilitarian assumptions in order to
engage the ideological dimensions of policy debates. However, while kritiks
have offered a valuable experience for students to uncover some of their
own ideological baggage, they have also questioned some of the core prin
ciples of academic debate.'^
In particular, the principle that a kritik absolves negatives from having to
advocate positive programs has been poorly received in some areas. For
" Gass, 1982.
William Shanahan. "Kritik of Thinking," Health Care Policy: Debating Coverage
Cures, Roger Soil and Ross Smith, eds., (Winston Salem, NC: Wake Forest University,
1993):A3-A8.
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some judges, utilitarianism under the guise of policymaking has been hard
to shake and kritiks have not been universally hailed or used to their greatest
degree.'^
In addition to their tendency to avoid clash, there are other forces that
have slowed acceptance of kritiks. In particular, the game metaphor that
initially nurtured kritiks has also slowed their progress. The idea of debate
being a rule-governed game with utilitarian ends has not sat well with many
judges. Instead, they generally want to know what utility will be served by
a particular punitive action. Oftentimes, it is difficult to associate a unique
harm to a unique game or player. Instead, those that use kritiks generally try
to take examples from the world of constitutive political action and apply
them to the hypothetical instance. In this case, the idea of punishment seems
to be the best warrant for making a kritik a voting issue. The concept of
punishment for breaking a rule that is emergent in a particular debate strikes
many judges as somewhat unfair.
Independent of the fairness and unfairness of kritiks as a source of debate
rules, the fact of the matter is that kritiks have been useful in interjecting
political ideology into debates. Rather than taking debate as a model for
future political action, effective kritiks take debates as a form of political
action. In this situation, and outside of the hypothetical domain, kritiks have
their intended effect; which is to question the limited assumptions of debat
ers.
The move to appreciate the linkage of ideology and language reflects
moves in the communication discipline, which, in many instances, plays the
role of parent to debate teams. Rather than engaging the scientific model
that has given us the Toulmin model and emphasized the metaphor of debate
as game or science, the linguistic turn promises us a debate future that em
phasizes political empowerment and participation over some sense of sci
entific description. In this sense, debate is moving into a truly post-modern
era.
In the discipline of rhetoric, which is largely populated by former debaters,
the idea of a critical rhetoric has become an important idea. Rather than
taking the criticism of language as an attempt to generate positive knowledge
about the ways that language works, the critical rhetoric movement has
sought to view the critique of language as a political act in itself.'" In sim
plistic terms, it works like this: if 1 choose to analyze the conservative rhetoric
of Preacher A, then I am not only learning about the way that their language
works to gain its effect, but I also unmask the message of Preacher A to make
it more explicit and to render some judgment about its ethical, aesthetic, or
ideological foundations. In this sense the analysis of language is itself a po
litical act. This political act takes the form of a critical rhetoric.
Matthew Shors and Steve Mancuso. "The Critique: Skreaming Without Raising
Its \/o\ce,"Health Care Policy: Debating Coverage Cures, Roger Solt and Ross Smith,
eds., (Winston-Salem, NC: Wake Forest University, 1993): A11-A18.
Raymie McKerrow. "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis," Communication
Monographs 56 (1989): 91-111; Raymie McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric in a Postmod
ern World, " Quarterly Journal of Speech 77 (1991): 75-78; Kent Ono and John Sloop.
"Committment to Telos—A Sustained Critical Rhetoric," Communication Monographs
59 (1992): 48-60.
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Debate as a Critical Rhetoric
We can take some of the insights of the critical rhetoric movement and
apply them to academic debate as we have come to know it. Rather than
taking the dominant metaphor for debate as a means of scientific investiga
tion that emphasizes the hypothetical and game-like qualities of debate, we
may do better to return to the early concept of debate as a type of political
action in itself.
While the game model of debate is useful because it comports with a
vision of debate as a substantive academic program that produces positive
knowledge, excuses debaters from arguing against their own political ori
entation, and permits students to experiment openly with new theoretical
positions, it also has its weaknesses that, ironically, flow from these strengths.
The current emphasis on a game model encourages students to be disingen-
uine in their argumentation, to stretch the limits of evidential credibility, and
to avoid clash by choosing from a nearly random list of comparative agents
of action. Most importantly, the game metaphor has the effect of disempow-
ering students by making their own arguments irrelevant to their lives.
Contemporary debate practice encourages debaters to do whatever it takes
to win. This strategic posturing has the effect of breaking the relationship
between debaters and their advocacy. Instead of advocating solutions that
flow from their convictions or that they believe will solve problems, they are
choosers who are encouraged to free-float from solution to solution without
much thought for what they are saying and without any sense of firm con
viction. This is particularly the case when students use agent counterplans
without reference to the initial agent of action. So, for example, on this past
year's high school debate resolution, the agent counterplan that had the Chi
nese government do the affirmative plan was a popular strategy. When em
ployed, to a case that had the United States encourage China to stop im
porting cigarettes, for example, a negative team could counterplan that it
would be better to have China do the plan.
The problem with this strategy is not that it is not net-beneficial, or even
that it is not competitive. It is easy to prove that it meets both of the rules-
based criteria we apply to counterplans. The problem with an agent coun
terplan like this is that it is disempowering to the debaters and the judge.
The fact that some third party, on whom no one in the room has any influ
ence, could solve the problem better seem to me to be an excuse for the
type of inaction that Mitchell identifies. It is akin to saying in a debate be
tween me and another coach about who should take out the trash that
George Bush should take it out. While it would meet all of the criteria of a
good plan, the fact that I am not former President Bush and that former
President Bush is no longer even a constitutive agent of mine means that
saying he should do it is just an excuse to do nothing. In the end the agree
ment that this is the best policy is an agreement to nothing except that I can
do nothing to solve the problem. This is debate at its politically disempow
ering worst.
The most obvious solution to this problem is to institute a rule that people
can not use third party agents. But, a rule is only as good as its legitimation
in the eyes of students or coaches and such rules have proven more of an
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incentive to revolutionary action than a deterrent. A stronger restriction is
something that, by its own logic, compels an action. In debate, the logic of
constitutive agents means that such solutions would be outside the scope of
our empowered discussion. If we are constrained to discussions of relevant
issues, we are more likely to come up with a satisfactory solution to our
dilemma while maintaining a high level of clash.
Mitchell's loophole is another possible solution to this problem. While his
recourse to individual action is appealing, it is not viable if we are to main
tain the high standards we have for discussion in a liberal society. As a coach
at a conservative religious school, my fear is that the "action plans" that
many of my students may offer from their own genuine involvement may not
fit with the ideological leanings of their judges or their opponents. In a world
where prayer is a significant form of social action and where missionary work
is a primary means for making social change, my fear is that the fiat loophole
for individual action may encourage judges to judge students ideas more on
the basis of who is taking the action rather than the benefits of the action
itself.
Similarly, the focus on individual action also has the limitation of, ideally,
making it impossible for students to actively debate topics for which they
have little personal interest—or demonstrate little personal initiative. In a
system that rewards constitutive agents, each topic is important because all
individuals, by necessity, must take some responsibility for all of its actions.
The constitutive agent system rewards all actions at all levels of political
involvement. Perhaps the heyday of debate-inspired political action was a
consequence of the close relationship of debate with democratic action and
personal responsibility.
The theory of constitutive agents also deals with some of the other prob
lems that plague contemporary fiat debates. Its logic limits the scope of de
bate to a few possible agents without forcing everyone to use the same agent.
It has the effect of limiting the range of clash in a debate without sacrificing
creativity. And, it has the effect of obviating discussions about what is "real"
and "unreal" for the sake of a hypothetical discussion. Instead, the theory of
constitutive action encourages debaters to explore the outer limits of their
own political power. Finally, the theory of constitutive action helps to limit
and enhance the force of kritiks in debate while making them more closely
fit their disciplinary context. Rather than flowing from the nature of hypo
thetical discussions and a need to punish and reward, they can perform as
ideological constraints on what are essentially political discussions.
Conclusions
Science's ethos overwhelmed academic debate in the middle of this cen
tury with promises of substantive knowledge and an escape from the political
demands of real advocacy. In return for these promises, debate had to sac
rifice much of its relevance as a forum for political action by becoming a
hypothetical game.
Recent developments in rhetorical theory and debate theory have brought
us to question the utility of debate as a source of knowledge and as a hy
pothetical exercise. In the place of the contemporary system of debate I have
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advocated that we abandon the paradigm of debate as a hypothetical game
and replace it with the earlier model of debate as a form of political action.
This model, which I term constitutive action, would have the practical effect
of limiting both affirmative and negative actions to actors that are constitutive
agents of the parties to the debate. This change will make debate practice
relevant to the parties involved, enhance clash in the debate, and improve
debaters' sense of political empowerment. This move will also improve de
bate by replacing the random system of rules that govern our game, with a
system of logic that compels particular actions, and encourages debaters to
establish emergent criteria within the debate while supplying a yardstick to
govern their effectiveness. Finally, this proposal has the benefits of comport
ing with many of the ideas that most debaters deeply harbor about debate
and appropriate subjects of debate.
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A recent article in this journal (Kramer & Lang, 1993) proposed a "Post
modern Decision making Paradigm" as an argumentative method and as an
evaluative tool. Careful consideration of the suggested paradigm occasions
reflection on the role paradigms and postmodernism might have in academic
debate. This essay explores the proposal that debate should be conducted
according to a postmodern perspective. After defining postmodernism, its
relationship to sophistic rhetoric is examined. This historical retrospective
reveals that postmodern tendencies, particularly advocacy of inconsistency,
run counter to the goals and conduct of argumentation. Next, the relationship
between postmodernism and paradigms is explored. Third, the purported
advantages of postmodern perspectives are subjected to critical scrutiny.
Fourth, the repercussions of postmodernism for academic debate are dis
cussed. Finally, a reduced emphasis on paradigms and a re-emphasis on
communal bases for decision making are suggested as remedies for problems
attendant to a "postmodern paradigm."
Throughout this discussion, the term debate applies generically to any rule-
governed argumentative exchange. Specific applications to competitive de
bate are identified as academic debate. As employed in this essay, the issues
regarding postmodernism in academic debate represent a particular context
for confronting postmodernism beyond the forum of debate rounds per se.
A definition of postmodernism is much more problematic. It is difficult to
identify the species of postmodernism Kramer and Lang (1993) advocate,
because they do not link the postmodern characteristics they identify with a
particular intellectual tradition. Defining postmodernism is difficult, for it
does not describe a methodology, doctrine, or any static body of theory. It
"remains, at best, an equivocal concept" that defies pigeonholing (Hassan,
1987a, p. 23). The varieties of intellectual projects and artistic objects labeled
as postmodern cast some "doubt [as to] whether the term can ever be dig
nified by conceptual coherence" (Boyne & Rattansi, 1990, p. 9). Instead,
postmodernism qualifies more as a spirit of inquiry, an attitude that distrusts
universalization and promotes the revelation of internal inconsistencies. Has
san (1987a) has inventoried the prominent characteristics of postmodernism
in its various incarnations. These qualities include;
1. Privileging indeterminacy instead of finality. This resistance to finality also
implies a rejection of historical teleology (Zavarzadeh & Morton, 1991).
2. Recognition that reality is fragmentary and disconnected.
3. Opposition to all canonical authority.
4. The free mixture of styles, genres, and traditions.
5. Emphasis on the conditionality and historicity of theories, which offer
perspectives rather than ultimate answers.
6. Focus on the processes of creation and interpretation instead of on static
objects or ideas.
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Each of the preceding qualities invites appropriation by debaters.
1. Precedents and model programs are treated with suspicion, since they
imply continuity with the past. If an affirmative plan has worked as a pilot
project, that success may have been due to the monopolization of funds
and skewing of reporting by the dominant power interests than to the
merits of the program.
2. The critique of causality is subsumed by postmodernism, because asser
tions of causal linkage are questioned. Furthermore, definitive knowledge
is disavowed.
3. There is no decision rule that transcends the individual round.
4. Multiple paradigms can co-exist productively.
5. Claims are evaluated not as true or false in themselves, but are contex-
tualized as having truth-value only within specified parameters. Not only
are conditional arguments recommended, but all arguments are subject
to revisions that restrict their domain of applicability.
6. Instead of evaluating the resolution or affirmative plan as a concrete pro
posal, debate would focus on the assumptions behind the way terminol
ogy is employed. The argumentative process becomes the center of at
tention, not supposedly completed proposals offered for wholesale adop
tion or rejection.
When postmodernism is suggested as a model or mindset for the practice of
debate, it may be imported in one or more of the preceding ways.
There is a big difference between observing what could be called a post
modern condition and elevating that condition to an "-ism" that would reg
ulate argumentative practice. Marshall (1992) understandably recommends
erasing the -ism suffix because it "suggests that here is something complete,
unified, totalized" (pp. 4-5). Postmodernism, in a word, resists specification
as a doctrine or method. Richard Bernstein (1991), frustrated with the incho
ate ways that 'postmodernity' has been used, suggests abandoning the term
altogether. Instead, he recommends further investigation of the issues raised
under the rubric of postmodernism. To clarify those issues, we must examine
the assumptions and implications of postmodernism.
Postmodernism and the Sophistic Tradition
Postmodernism sometimes gets touted as a dramatic rupture with the past,
a radical discontinuity with Enlightenment traditions of rational discourse. In
this sense, it is tempting to label the postmodern movement a paradigm shift
in argumentative rationality. That label, however, would generate more con
fusion than clarity. As will be seen later, postmodernism opposes the regu
lative functions that lie at the heart of paradigms. More generally, postmod
ernists could contend that the traditional ideals of debate were valid but have
outlived their usefulness. If this were so, then proponents of postmodernism
would be advocating a form of historicism that presumes an ability to judge
(on heretofore unidentified grounds) the compatibility of theories with events
(Crook, 1990). That is, postmodernists would presume to know the moment
in history when an idea no longer serves a function. Such a claim runs
counter to the postmodern enthusiasm for indeterminacy. On the other hand,
if traditional argumentative rationale is wrong or undesirable in principle,
then postmodern ism's opposition rests on the very sort of universal standards
or truths that postmodernism decries.
The pre-Socratic logos that emerges in Gorgias could qualify as a progen-
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itor of postmodernism. Gorgias has been identified as a source for many
postmodern sentiments. The skepticism Gorgias exhibited toward absolute
knowledge "has resurfaced in the theories of postmodernists and poststruc-
turalists such as Lyotard and Foucault" (Sandmann, 1993, p. 100). Certainly
it would be anachronistic to label Gorgias a proto-postmodernist. Gorgias
does, however, problematize the unity and consistency of language and
thought, disrupting logical order. Furthermore, Lyotard and Foucault focus
on the same issue that Gorgias contemplated: the centrality of temporally
bound language instead of timeless epistemological systems in legitimizing
knowledge claims (Sandmann, 1993). In this respect, the Gorgian style and
concept of rhetoric raise questions about the need and desirability for con
sistency—the very questions postmodernism poses. The Gorgian conception
of rhetoric presages postmodernist views of argumentation in "privileging no
position . . . and staking out no ground of knowledge" (Sandmann, 1993, p.
99). In his self-labeled postmodern "pastiche," Vitanza (1994, p. 183) adopts
the Gorgian view that language does not serve as an orderly guide or model
for a linearly progressing history of rhetoric. Some scholars have recom
mended a return to sophistic rhetoric, identifying Gorgias as the proper philo
sophical springboard for rhetorical theory. With his opposition to Plato's ide
alism, Gorgias becomes especially attractive to postmodernists as a rhetori
cian whose practice did not require or posit universal, logically grounded
axioms (Enos, 1976; Gronbeck, 1972; Sutton, 1994). Postmodernism reha
bilitates the sophistic bases of rhetoric by revivifying the sophistic endorse
ments of many possible truths. The problem is how to bridge the gap between
an utter denial of truth (probably the basis for Gorgias's refusal to claim that
he taught arete) and a dogmatic assertion that a single truth should reign.
Placed in the context of debate, the question arises as to how a middle
ground might be constructed between (1) an overly stringent and perhaps
irrelevant paradigm that stifles creativity, and (2) the abandonment of fun
damental logical and ethical standards that would render decision making
chaotic and unjustifiable. Postmodern theorists still grapple with that task.
A somewhat different reading of the history of rhetoric is possible, how
ever. This interpretation finds greater divergence between inconsistency and
the sophistic tradition. Kramer and Lang's historical justification for inconsis
tent argumentation invokes Gorgias and Protagoras, who supposedly en
dorsed the simultaneous advocacy of mutually exclusive positions. Upon
closer examination, however, sophistic argumentation reveals much deeper
epistemological roots. The sophists often did deny the existence of a single,
universal logos that would ground any one position as immutably true. The
ability to prove one position as easily as one can prove its opposite does not
entail an epistemological commitment to both positions as equally true.
The series of challenges Gorgias levels in On Non-Being proceed logically:
Nothing exists; if it did, it could not be known; if it could be known it could
not be communicated; if it could be communicated it could not be under
stood. These contentions never commit Gorgias to upholding mutually ex
clusive positions simultaneously. Instead of the tactic of inconsistency, where
the argument proceeds a • —a, Gorgias sets up a gauntlet of internally
consistent disjunctions and causal chains. Gorgias uses the mutability of truth
to deny the existence of a "normative natural order," (Kramer & Lang, 1993,
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p. 59), not to sanction internal contradiction at will. Far from endorsing in
consistency, Gorgias highlights the risk of relying on "delusive and inconsis
tent" opinion (Wheelwright, 1966, p. 250). Instead of contradicting himself,
Gorgias poses dialectical oppositions in order to ascertain truth, although
these truths themselves are mutable and contingent (Enos, 1976). The con
tradictory character of Gorgian philosophy, far from praising inconsistency,
uses inconsistent conclusions as an indictment of Eleatic reasoning and the
prevailing epistemology that propounded universal truth (Versenyi, 1963).
Schiappa (1995) reads Gorgias as a progenitor of rational argumentation, an
interpretation supported by Gorgias's identification of his own technique as
a form of reasoning (p. 316).
Inconsistency must be distinguished from relativism, especially since con
fusing them easily renders the sophists and thereby the early history of rhet
oric as maneuvering for personal advantage and little else. Even the arch-
relativists Protagoras and Gorgias present their cases logically and consis
tently. When Protagoras declares that "man [sic] is the measure of all things,"
he does not discard all epistemological yardsticks and endorse inconsistency.
Instead, Protagoras points to the dependence of ethical, perceptual, and epis
temological statements on the specific human conditions to which they refer
(Versenyi, 1963). For example, the attribute 'cold' is meaningful only in re
lation to the person experiencing it and to the parameters people set for
measuring temperature. At no point does Protagoras claim that the same
sensation qualifies as simultaneously hot and cold to the same person.
Gorgias also separates relativism from inconsistency, arguing quite consis
tently for relativism. The Gorgias antinomies show how any moral proposi
tion is as easy to prove true as its opposite. The variability of virtue denies
its universality and immutability. These antinomies reveal that an equally
strong case can be made for opposing sides on an issue. Gorgias demon
strates what any debater recognizes: every argument has an equally strong
counterargument. Such a position employs logically consistent arguments on
either side to reveal the antinomy as unresolvable. The only inconsistency is
the opposing sides of the antinomy.
Besides having problematic historical roots, postmodernism and the atten
dant emphasis on inconsistency pose difficulties when forwarded as a par
adigm. To examine the role of postmodernism as a paradigm requires clar
ification of how paradigms operate and their role in debate.
Postmodernism and Paradigms
Exactly what paradigms are and how they function remain controversial.
Margaret Masterman (1970) identifies twenty-one senses in which Kuhn em
ploys the term. This ambiguity led Kuhn to reduce the "more fundamental"
meaning of 'paradigm' to exemplars and models shared as patterns of ap
proaching problems indigenous to a field (1977b, p. 463). Two senses of
'paradigm' bear special relevance to debate: its status as a regulative standard
and as a label for the underlying assumptions of argumentation (cf. Master-
man, 1970).
A paradigm as an exemplar or model structures debate by providing an
activity or process that serves as a controlling metaphor (Berube, 1994). For
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a paradigm in this sense to guide debate, participants must recognize simi
larities between debate practice and the exemplar, much as a scientist tackles
new problems by recognizing their analogues in the exemplary problems
shared by members of the field (Kuhn, 1977b). Paradigms help define what
counts as legitimate and illegitimate argumentation, and they delimit the field
of argumentation by offering grounds for decision-making criteria. This reg
ulative role links debate paradigms with paradigms employed in other aca
demic contexts such as science.
Postmodernism in debate might seem to be a fait accompli. After all, the
multiplicity of paradigms could testify to the localization of epistemological
claims, thereby enacting the postmodern admonition to "give up the luxury
of absolute Truths, choosing instead to put to work local and provisional
truths" (Marshall, 1992, p. 3). This point invites two responses. First, a plu
rality of paradigms does not require or prove the presence of postmodernism.
The conditionality and multiplicity of truths can be and is accomplished
without any need for abandoning a progressive ideal of better argumentative
practice. Ideas and practices can improve without positing a singular epitome
of perfection. Second, the presence of multiple paradigms and their tendency
to proliferate testifies to the problematic epistemological status of research
in debate. An invitation to construct ever more "new and improved" para
digms—what debaters might label "paradigm prolif"—undermines claims for
debate to acquire scholarly legitimacy. Let us consider each of these points.
This point receives further development in the final section of this essay.
To place postmodernism in the context of paradigms, it is useful to turn to
figures such as Rorty and Lyotard, considered "the original sources of post
modern philosophy" in America (Lemert, 1991, p. 181). Lyotard "remains
today perhaps the most influential theorist of postmodernity" (Boyne & Rat-
tansi, 1990, p. 13). In most of its incarnations, postmodernism designates the
distrust of comprehensive rational foundations of knowledge. The rejection
of foundationalism often targets scientific reasoning, which has epitomized
ultimate explanations in the absence of authoritarian pronouncements (the
ultimatums of autocrats) or divine law. The fact that science bears the brunt
of postmodern wrath will loom large when we reconsider paradigms.
The advocacy of a postmodern paradigm strikes a discordant note because
postmodernism and paradigms as employed in academic debate are incom
patible. Postmodernism as an epistemological orientation rejects transhistor-
ical criteria for what counts as truth, knowledge, or meaning. Put succinctly,
a postmodern attitude fosters "incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard,
1984, p. xxiv). Surprisingly, Kramer and Lang defend postmodernism while
offering it as "an overarching argumentative strategy" (1993, p. 58). Any
attempt to construct an argumentative framework that has universal validity
no longer qualifies as postmodern, but falls squarely within the convention
ally modernist mission of modeling debate after science (hypothesis testing)
or legislative deliberation (rational policy making), or storytelling (narrativity).
A less relativistic version of postmodernism would not undercut the em
ployment of paradigms per se. Instead, it would pose paradigms provision
ally, advocating the reflexive recognition that one is operating within the
constraints of a culturally and historically specific "paradigm of thought"
(Marshall, 1992, p. 3). In short, any theory operates "within a certain para-
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digm" of background assumptions (Marshall, 1992, p. 187). This version of
postmodernism offers cumbersome theoretical baggage that acknowledges
what current debate practice already takes into account. Does any debater
or critic claim that a paradigm offers a path to ultimate truth? Probably not.
Explaining hypothesis-testing, Zarefsky characterizes the knowledge avail
able through debate as probable truth which, like scientific knowledge, is
not "eternal and unchanging" (1992, p. 255). Instead, paradigms lend struc
ture to argumentation by providing models for the argumentative process.
Depending on the paradigm employed, different criteria for assent will re
ceive more or less emphasis.
The theoretical basis for postmodernism as a paradigm appears shaky, lhab
Hassan says on behalf of postmodernists: "In absence of a cardinal principle
or paradigm, we turn to play, interplay, dialogue, polylogue, allegory, self-
reflection—in short, to irony" (1987b, p. 170, emphasis added; cf. Hassan,
1987a, p. 20). A postmodern approach develops as a response to the absence
or deconstruction of paradigms. Postmodernists seek to expose paradigms as
untrustworthy and unnecessary normative structures, not rebuild these same
epistemological edifices.
Hypothesis Testing and Postmodernism
Might hypothesis testing open the door for postmodernism to enter debate?
For several reasons, it is problematic to claim that hypothesis-testing permits
inconsistent argumentation and thus sanctions a postmodernist approach to
debate (Kramer & Lang, 1993, p. 59). First, the theoretical basis for the hy
pothesis-testing paradigm is scientific reasoning, the evaluation of alternative
hypotheses as explanations. The word 'alternative' plays a key role here.
When multiple mutually exclusive or incompatible counterplans are advo
cated under a hypothesis testing paradigm, they are run conditionally—
hence the phrase "hypothetical counterplans" (Kramer & Lang, 1993, p. 59).
In scientific practice, incompatible hypotheses are entertained, but as alter
natives. Logically, the proposal of alternative hypotheses proceeds by dis
junction rather than conjunction. Where A and B are inconsistent hypothe
ses, the choice of hypotheses employs disjunctive syllogism unless the in
consistency can be resolved by a higher-order theory that integrates both
hypotheses. The arguments about the nature of light furnish an excellent
example. The particle and wave theories of light were deemed irreconcilable
unless (1) light had properties that could be explained by some third theory,
(2) the particle and wave theories could be subsumed under a theory that
rendered them consistent, and/or (3) light took on the properties of a particle
or a wave depending on specific circumstances. A postmodern approach
would recommend settling for paradox while denying the desirability or per
haps possibility of searching for further explanations that would resolve the
conundrum.
A second curiosity attendant to linking postmodernism with hypothesis
testing is that postmodernism is incompatible with any theory that uses sci
ence as an authority or model for reasoning. An editor of Science magazine
lamented that postmodernism "is decidedly antiscience" (Nicholson, 1993,
p. 143). Lyotard, whose The Postmodern Condition "enjoys a certain defin-
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itive status in discussion[s] of postmodernism" (Callinicos, 1990, p. 3), targets
science as the focus of his attack on authoritative explanations. Far from
endorsing science as a model for reasoning, as hypothesis-testing does, Ly-
otard (1984) emphasizes the limits of science and implies its elitist reliance
on expertise reduces opportunities to form social bonds. Exactly how post
modernism might be incorporated into a hypothesis-testing approach re
mains puzzling.
In fact, postmodernism seems to undercut the basis of scientifically
grounded judgments. Zarefsky (1992) points to the virtues of using science
as a model for debate: science "yields knowledge that is reliable and con
sistent" (p. 253). Consistency is the primary target of Kramer and Lang's
(1993) attack on overly restrictive argumentative practices. Reliability suffers
from similar limitations, since postmodernists would claim that the standards
of reliability are generated by those who hold the power to define acceptable
levels of deviation from a norm. Furthermore, if creativity is a virtue, then
uniqueness and not replicability of results should be encouraged.
Far from hypothesis-testing allowing a postmodern perspective, postmod
ernism provides the critical resources for undermining the epistemological
assumptions at the foundation of scientific rationality. A central lesson of
postmodernism has been its denial that science should serve as the control
ling model for all rational activity. Considerable doubt has been cast on
whether a single scientific method exists at all (Feyerabend, 1993), and even
if it did it has not established an enviable track record for improving the
quality of life. Academic debate rounds furnish ample testimony to this point,
with their plethora of arguments about the evils of technology. Scientifically
authorized decisions do not necessarily operate in the best interest of non-
scientists. The reification of scientific method as a regulative ideal for ration
ality has been criticized roundly by those who harbor suspicions that tech
nocratic imperatives do not improve the quality of life (Horkheimer, 1974).'
Recent sociological examinations of science have questioned whether scien
ce's epistemological dominance in modern Western culture has been due to
methodological strictures. Researchers such as Latour (1988) point to indi
vidual and institutional conflicts and alliances, not methodological unity, as
the root of science's hegemony over Western thought. The focus on histori
cally specific and material sites of scientific power accord with Foucault's
(1980) observation that proclamations of methodological rigor and postures
of impartiality stake claims to power more than they index science's privi
leged access to truth. As a whole, these criticisms of scientific rationality are
compatible with postmodern tendencies of thought but inimical to any par
adigm dependent on scientific rationality.
Purported Advantages of Postmodernism
Zavarzadeh and Morton (1991) contend that cogent arguments against
postmodernism can arise only from considering its "consequences and ef-
' These criticisms do not distinguish between science and technology, since the
theorists cited treat technocracy as an outgrowth of the hegemony of science over
public policy. Whether such domination of science is a fact in public affairs is another
question.
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fects" (p. 121). In other words, what sorts of attitudes and practices would
result from a postmodern perspective? The emphasis on effects is prominent
because, the authors contend, any logically based arguments (e.g., accusa
tions of logical inconsistency or fallacious reasoning) would attempt to sub
ject postmodernism to the strictures of the very logical framework it rejects.
Taking this point a step further, "the very deployment of logical argumenta
tion against (post)modernism would unfortunately legitimate a rather reac
tionary notion of truth" because it would presume universal criteria for ra
tionality that restrict innovation and invest only one disputant with The Truth
(Zavarzadeh & Morton, 1991, p. 121). Zarefsky (1992) makes a similar point
in the context of debate. He explains that the choice among paradigms is
difficult because none can be attacked except on the terms it recognizes as
legitimate. Zarefsky suggests examining how a paradigm might undermine
its own purposes. Let us consider how postmodernism might do just that.
Social Emancipation
The varieties of postmodernism share a political focus (Boyne & Rattansi,
1990, p. 23) in their goal to recover discourse that has been marginalized
or silenced by hegemonic ideals of argumentation. In debate rounds, the
advantages associated with postmodern critiques, for example, usually stem
from giving "voice to the powerless and marginalized" (Lake & Haynie,
1993, p. 17). In fact, postmodernism may be characterized as "a shifting and
differential cultural site of social struggles" rather than a "settled or stable"
set of doctrines (Zavarzaeh & Morton, 1991, p. 106). If postmodernism per
se has a project, it is to disrupt the argumentative ideals that constricted
discourse to conform with Enlightenment models of rationality. In the context
of public or academic debate, a postmodern project would involve a revision
of the canon of "classic" argumentative exchanges to include discussions
that fall outside the mainstream political parties and campaign issues. The
question arises, however, as to why postmodernists would recommend such
revisions.
The inability to find an answer in postmodernism has made some feminist
theorists uncomfortable with a postmodern emancipatory project. Since post
modernism devalues consensus as a central objective, it falls short in ex
plaining why any underrepresented group such as women might merit rec
ognition as a group (Lovibond, 1990). By placing highest priority on contin
uance of discourse, postmodernism cannot identify or endorse material signs
of progress toward reducing oppression. Quite the contrary: by aiming for
continuance instead of closure, disagreement and contentiousness (not con
cessions or acts of liberation) have intrinsic merit (Lovibond, 1990). Post
modernism leaves the deeper questions about the roots of oppression and
marginalization unanswered. What resources does postmodernism offer for
expanding the ranges of options open for underrepresented populations (Lov
ibond, 1990, p. 172)? To expand available opportunities requires more far-
reaching social actions than individual deviations from norms or distrust of
totalizing narratives. Postmodernism in any of its incarnations has failed to
give methods for dealing with uncertainty, the distrust of timeless truths, and
the decay of universal values. Postmodernism provides insufficient inventive
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resources to provide solutions for the narrow epistemologica! habits it criti
cizes.
If postmodernism can earn its keep as a productive or advantageous mode
of thought, it must offer some methods for resolving disputes and reaching
decisions. Postmodernism offers few recommendations for improving the
means to effect social change or render judgment. This lack of a critical edge
has led Rorty (1991a) to criticize postmodernists such as Foucault for re
vealing the methods of social manipulation without providing routes to es
cape them. Similarly, James L. Marsh finds in postmodernism "no criteria to
indicate whether or why we should move forward, no groups identified
whose position in the social structure presents a possibility or probability of
transcendence, no identifiable crisis points within the system" (1992a, p. 94).
Postmodernism ultimately endorses "a stance of pessimism and quietism"
on social issues since "it can offer no positive, constructive ethics or politics"
(Marsh, 1992a, p. 94; 1992b, p. 208).
It is inappropriate to discuss postmodernism as "an overarching argumen
tative strategy" (Kramer & Lang, 1993, p. 58) since postmodernism is directed
against the very notion of such all-encompassing discursive strategies. Ly-
otard's opposition to Habermas's advocacy of universal consensus lies in the
denial of "metaprescriptions regulating the totality of statements circulating
in the social collectivity" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 65). Lyotard enjoins his readers
to "wage a war on totality" (1984, p. 82), a call that does not sound con
ducive to paradigm-building, or to sweeping reforms that would target the
institutional bases for repressive social practices.
Postmodernism, unlike critical theories such as feminism or socialism, pro
vides few if any resources to counter institutionalized forms of oppression
that might be pervasive but exist in several forms and on several levels of
society. The distrust of grand explanations generates a suspicion of universals
but leaves untouched "the complexities of the social, political and economic
formations that exist as part of a heterogeneous but interdependent global
configuration" (Boyne & Rattansi, 1990, p. 19). In other words, repressive
forces can be manifested in ways other than the unitary, overarching, grand
narratives that Lyotard and other postmodernists target. For example, how
could postmodernism offer a means of redressing economic elitism, racism,
or sexism in competitive debate? Phrased in the language of policy debate,
what potential for solvency does postmodernism offer? Because of its elusive
character, postmodernism cannot be instituted in any case because it is not
a body of doctrine but a critical attitude.
Two tendencies of postmodernism render it ineffective in accomplishing
the very political tasks that supposedly lie at its core: "an inability to specify
possible mechanisms of change, and an inability to state why change is better
than no change" (Crook, 1990, p. 59). The first difficulty has been encoun
tered in the inability to instigate or even take account of a need for broad-
based social reform. The second point, advocacy of change, raises another
set of issues.
It is difficult to envision how postmodernism could justify any social re
forms, even the most localized changes in debate practices. If the quality of
discussion hinges on the multiplicity of viewpoints articulated, then expres
sions of intolerance such as sexism, racism and homophobia presumably
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deserve encouragement because they add to the plurality of perspectives
(Crook, 1990). Debate conducted in a postmodern manner would not and
could not justify ruling out offensive ad hominem argumentative practices.
Even if such intolerance were not sanctioned by a postmodern mindset, it
should be unacceptable. Although proponents of postmodernism might
agree, the decision to restrict available argumentative tactics runs counter to
the cardinal postmodern value of creativity. Paradoxically, the most intolerant
and repressive social agendas become legitimate even if not explicitly en
dorsed under the postmodern rubric of creative expression.
Enhanced Creativity
One argument Kramer and Lang (1993) suggest to support a postmodern
paradigm cites the value of creativity. Allowing inconsistency would open
the floodgates for debaters' creative juices to flow freely, thus irrigating
parched argumentative ground. Does relaxation of strictures encourage cre
ativity? The lesson from paradigms in science shows the opposite to be the
case. In an often overlooked early essay, Kuhn (1977, pp. 225-239) remarks
on what he calls the "essential tension" in science. Paradoxically, the tra
dition-bound nature of science with its preservation of "normal science"
obedient to paradigmatic strictures has been conducive to innovation. Only
when the boundaries of normal science are clearly articulated in a paradigm
do practitioners begin to question the paradigm's articulation. Who are the
innovators? Kuhn explains that "the productive scientist must be a tradition
alist who enjoys playing intricate games by pre-established rules in order to
be a successful innovator who discovers new rules and new pieces with
which to play them" (1977, p. 237). Applying this principle to debate, the
innovators can redefine the game only if the game already has set boundaries
and rules. The test of creativity lies in the ability to improvise within guide
lines, not rewrite the guidelines to accommodate novelty.
We now confront the question: "Why artificially limit the size of the play
ing field" (Kramer & Lang, 1994, p. 67) by prohibiting inconsistency? First,
no clear distinction has been made between "artificial" versus "natural"
limits, and no reason has been given to prefer one over the other. Second,
preserving the game metaphor, all games have rules or they cease to become
games. The reason for regulative paradigms that limit argumentative options
is both logical and pragmatic. If all argumentative options are allowed, then
an infinite regress occurs because no standards emerge from the paradigm
to evaluate the quality of the arguments (Panetta & Herbeck, 1993, p. 26).
The regress turns vicious in debate or in any deliberative forum because
decisions must be made and justified.
Pragmatically, the procedural regulations in debate rounds mitigate against
unconstrained invention. In competitive debate these constraints are de
signed to achieve definite closure if not definitive solutions. Strict time limits
and zero-sum decisions mimic how deliberation often must proceed because
policies must be formulated and issues decided under the pressure of the
moment. Contrary to this realistic albeit imperfect scenario, "resolution and
closure are not goals of the postmodern moment" (Marshall, 1992, p. 13).
I?anetta and Herbeck (1993) observe that the intellectual grounds of post-
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modernism are so alien to those of policy debate that it is not possible to
reconcile these incommensurable perspectives. Since postmodernism con
demns two-valued thinking, it cannot in principle qualify as a clear-cut al
ternative to other orientations. The more that advocates of postmodernism
portray it as a dramatic rupture with other modes of thought, the more they
exemplify the very all-or-nothing mentality they condemn as elitist and ex-
clusivistic. This inconsistency is not simply logical, but instead constitutes a
failure to reconcile proclaimed goals with actual argumentative practice.
The Employment of Postmodernism in Academic Debate
It is difficult to justify how postmodernism could be argued in debate
rounds without undermining its own decision criteria. Before delving into
the mechanics of postmodernism in academic debate, one key point merits
attention. Postmodernism cannot and should not be advocated as a voting
issue. The "thoroughly hierarchical constructs" of winning and losing "are
fundamentally incompatible with the post-modern agenda" (Lake & Haynie,
1993, p. 19). To qualify as a "voter," postmodernism would have to function
as a decision rule. This role could be fulfilled in two ways, both of which
reduce postmodernism to incoherence or pernicious relativism. If a team
deserves to lose because it fails to foster creativity by allowing paralogical
argumentation (e.g., inconsistency, non sequitur, etc.), then creativity and
freedom are being postulated as values sufficient to merit voting for the team
that best promotes them. That being the case, postmodernism is reducible to
traditional liberal values. More problematically, postmodernism appeals to
creativity and related values as sufficient criteria for rendering decisions.
Bernstein (1991) observes that postmodernists such as Lyotard and Rorty re
sort to "a universal 'letting be' where difference is allowed to flourish" (p.
222), a laissez-faire epistemology just as sweeping and potentially just as
constraining as conventional rationality. In other words, this version of post
modernism relies on normative criteria accepted as inherently desirable—
the very sort of grand standards postmodernism is designed to combat.
Postmodern argumentation could assume a more critical edge that might
not commit its proponents to indefensible universal decision criteria. This
version of postmodernism would recommend at least suspending judgment
(i.e., not voting for the opposing side) because the opposition fails to account
for the "other" in its argumentation. Employed by the negative, postmodern
ism could underlie either a resolutionally-focused or case-focused critique.
The basic argument would be for rejection of the resolution or the affirmative
plan because its very language or assumptions exclude social forces or peo
ple that, despite their marginalization, should count as significant stakehold
ers in decision making. Of course, if the critique is argued as an independent
voting issue, then it falls prey to the reification of values just discussed. On
the other hand, a postmodern critique could carry an impact similar to a
studies counterplan that urges a negative ballot in lieu of sufficient infor
mation to vote affirmative. Failure to account for marginalized social groups
leads to decisions that are myopic at best and often paternalistic or destruc
tive toward those who are excluded. The postmodern position would not
presume that the voices of the marginalized are ipso facto liberating or ben-
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eficial. Instead, a much more modest claim emerges: irrespective of its actual
impact, hitherto suppressed perspectives deserve inclusion.
The claim that postmodern perspectives would liberate decision making,
however, relies on the premise that inclusiveness in rendering decisions is
desirable. If, for example, it is argued that formulation of foreign policy to
ward Mexico should include more Mexican or Hispanic participation, the
advantage would be more participatory decision making. The advocate of
postmodernism, however, has no grounds for claiming that participation
would render better decisions, especially since a postmodern foreign policy
would deny any single, overarching value that would guide policymaking.
Present American foreign policy toward Mexico, Latin America in general,
or toward the world for that matter, already qualifies as thoroughly post
modern. Without the guiding influence of containing communism, foreign
policy decisions are made on an ad hoc basis. Inconsistent policies, contrary
to the supposed virtues of postmodernism, have caused international em
barrassment and public disgrace to the United States in Haiti, Somalia, and
countless other locales. Inconsistency per se is no more a virtue than rigidity.
For a postmodern view to generate advantages, it must assert what counts
as an advantage. Postmodern critiques do little to replace current patterns of
thinking, although they question and criticize those patterns relentlessly. Ex
actly what sorts of reforms would postmodernism promulgate? Postmodern
ism has not generated coherent strategies—even provisional ones—for cop
ing with change and uncertainty. McGee (1990) states the point unequivo
cally: "I think it is time to stop whining about the so-called 'post-modern
condition' and to develop realistic strategies to cope with it as a fact of
human life, perhaps in the present, certainly in the not-too-distant twenty-
first century" (p. 278). The problem is not so much that postmodern per
spectives have arisen, but that they have failed to offer productive alternatives
to excessive rigidity of thought.
Postmodern Critiques
Many critiques in debate rounds have been launched under the banner of
postmodernism. Run as a critique, postmodernism typically emerges as fol
lows: The opposing team (not merely their case but their entire mode of
argumentation) exemplifies an undesirable way of thinking. From a post
modern perspective, such undesirable thought patterns typically involve mar-
ginalization of oppressed populations, cultural imperialism, masculinist
agendas, anthropocentrism, all-or-nothing mentalities, etc. By voting for the
affirmative, the critic would endorse these undesirable thought patterns. Cri
tiques typically ask the critic to make a personal decision against the affir
mative, since any implications of setting a precedent for making policy run
counter to the postmodern rejection of linear reasoning and trend-setting. I
quote from one such brief: "All the critique asks is that you make a personal,
conditional moral choice to inform your action."^ The critic, therefore, op
erates as a lone voice whose vote represents nothing more than a personal
^ All the quotes from debate brief are from materials generated at the 1995 National
Debate Institute at the University of Vermont.
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commitment against the affirmative and for the liberating benefits attendant
to postmodernism.
Now is not the time to enter into a detailed discussion of critiques, a
subject beyond the scope of this essay. Some remarks on postmodern cri
tiques, however, will illustrate the problematic infusion of postmodern think
ing into competitive debate. To begin, postmodernism cannot be advocated
as a voting issue. Arguing postmodernism as a basis for decision-making
presumes a hierarchy of values, a method that the advocate of postmodern
ism forwards as a decision rule. Many postmodern critiques, for example,
rely on a simply punishment paradigm: punish the team that advocates the
undesirable way of thinking by voting against them. Notice, however, that a
notion of desirability lurks behind the postmodern critique. The critique must
presume a standard for decision making that transcends the individual round;
after all, the postmodern arguments almost always are found on shells that
are employed virtually unchanged round after round. The use of such stan
dardized argumentative tactics shows a commitment to the critique as a
constant. The more a standard critique is used, the less credible is its link to
postmodernism, which advocates creative, individual argumentation—ex
actly the values that prefabricated arguments do not foster.
An advocate of postmodernism might respond that the critique invokes
and applies values only locally. A negative brief on the subject states: "...
we ask you [the critic] to generate morals within the context of this debate,
not enforce them universally." The localization of advantages resembles the
argument Zavarzadeh and Morton (1991) make in defending postmodernism
against the charge of political quietism. They distinguish ludic postmodern
ism, which seeks local, small-scale political change, from resistance post
modernism, which "works not simply for an ideological intervention and a
change of social practices, but for the transformation of the economic struc
tures that bring about those local conditions to begin with" (Zvarzadeh &
Morton, 1991, p. 128). The specification of economic structures reflects a
lingering Marxist strain that presumes economic factors lie at the core of
social problems. Such a Marxist remnant is troublesome given the postmod
ern denial of economics (or any other single principle) as the basis of social
relationships.
Either variety of postmodernism, ludic or resistance, spells trouble for the
team employing it in a debate round. Ludic postmodernism promises nothing
in the realm of solvency because its only mode of addressing problems is
piecemeal. Furthermore, even if solvency could be obtained, it would be
inefficient because it would consist of a conglomeration of decentralized,
overlapping, and probably poorly funded efforts. These difficulties, of course,
should not discredit small-scale problem solving, but they cast serious doubt
on whether any definite, positive social impact can be expected from adopt
ing a postmodern perspective. Since implementation of any postmodern pro
gram would be a purely individual matter (given the postmodern praise of
individuality and creativity), the results would be unpredictable and com
pliance could be mandated only at the expense of sabotaging the premise
of epistemological liberation that drives postmodern thought.
Resistance postmodernism, in turn, is problematic because postmodernism
undermines the very sorts of concepts that would foster the formation of
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social movements. Individuals coalesce into a movement for the sake of
something greater than themselves. Social action is instigated for the sake of
a cause that transcends the individual social agent. Although universal ideals
have been invoked to justify horrendous injustices, postmodernism fails to
offer any means for catalyzing social change via concerted action.
Hassan (1987a) suggests a way to sidestep postmodern relativism while
retaining the useful spirit of distrusting purportedly universal and ahistorical
theories. He proposes a "critical pluralism" that would encourage interpre
tive diversity, highlight the cultural and temporal limits to theorizing, and
"attempt to contain" postmodernism's relativistic tendencies (1987a, p.23).
Hassan confesses, however, that no means of establishing consensus emerge
within a postmodern framework. The critical pluralism Hassan proposes,
which resembles Habermas's ideal speech situation, offers no checks on the
exertion of power or on degeneration into relativism that fails to resolve—
even provisionally—any issues (Hassan, 1987a, p. 32). We are left, then,
with a renunciation of power and domination but without an affirmation of
shared methods, traditions, or other bases of community for resolving con
flicts, redressing grievances, or rendering decisions. Postmodernism pur
chases individual freedom at the cost of communal foundations for action.
Postmodernism is particularly unsuitable as a critique because it falls prey
to a false dichotomy, treating postmodern perspectives as clear alternatives
to inflexible thought patterns. Debaters seem to run postmodern critiques
and cases as if they offered clear alternatives; either modernism or postmod
ernism, but not both. The choice is not whether to opt for postmodernism
because, as McGee observes, the postmodern era is upon us. The unresolved
challenge is to go beyond the postmodern distrust of epistemological rigidity.
Goodnight (1995), although he might disagree with the reading of Gorgias
offered in this essay, traces the epistemological roots of postmodernism to
the ancient Greek skeptics. Goodnight (1995) labels postmodernism "a skep
ticism sweeping into and out of the academy for well over two decades" (p.
269). Postmodernism easily degenerates into a pernicious skepticism by re
vealing overly restrictive thought patterns without redressing them.
A postmodern critique supposedly offers improved ways of thinking, yet it
presents no means of translating thought into action. Without some kinds of
ideals beyond the celebration of individual creativity, postmodernism decon
structs social practices without offering anything in their place (Fairlamb,
1994). Exactly what would a critic be voting for if deciding in favor of a
postmodern critique?
Repercussions of Postmodernism
The allowance of inconsistency, while apparently a positive step, actually
removes a basis for decision making without proposing any productive al
ternative to replace it. A crucial weakness of postmodernism arises here: the
tendency to place itself in opposition to supposedly dominant practices and
intellectual currents without going beyond them. A postmodern outlook
works well as a means of inquiry, questioning the grounds and usefulness of
discursive and political institutions. It falls short, however, in offering correc
tives that redress the harms of these institutions (Kuspit, 1990).
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Far from presenting means to escape repressive social practices, postmod
ernism could fuel the very repression it criticizes. By negating the role of
public deliberation, postmodernism replaces rationality with will power as
the means for deciding controversy. Explaining the postmodern aspects of
Jurassic Park, Goodnight (1995) observes that "it is will, not reason, that
confirms genius in the postmodern moment" (p. 275). In debate rounds,
therefore, intellectual acumen would not reap rewards under a postmodern
view. Instead, the ability to impose one's will on another, be that through
persuasion or physical force, would merit praise. Lest this conclusion seem
far-fetched, recall that within a postmodern framework there are no a priori
preferences for persuasion over coercion. From a postmodern perspective,
there is no "unique value to 'rational' as opposed to other forms of justifi
cation" such as force (Harris & Rowland, 1993, p. 31). Postmodern heroes,
for example, are not necessarily technical experts, but they do know how to
manipulate the resources at hand (Goodnight, 1995). Is this the primary les
son debaters should learn from the activity?
Unbridled argumentative inclusiveness also invites abuses. Some view
points, such as fascism, have been marginalized in order to encourage par
ticipation. I submit, with Hirst (1993), that certain practices such as blatant
intolerance, racism, sexism, and homophobia have no justification and de
serve no place in argumentation. Such means of "arguing" should be mar
ginalized. Without some criteria for distinguishing justifiable versus unjusti
fiable marginalization, blatantly abusive behavior in debate rounds could be
tolerated or even promoted in the name of free expression. Not all "other
ness" qualifies as virtue (Bernstein, 1991). Designation as an oppressed
group does not constitute a prima facie case for status as righteous but un
fairly persecuted.
The fundamental problem in applying postmodernism to debate is that
postmodernism functions best as a critical tool, not as an evaluative method
or a set of adjudicative standards. It is designed to expose and question
unquestioned assumptions. The supposedly radical break postmodernism
makes with previous epistemological practice makes it unsuitable for use in
an activity such as academic debate, which is thoroughly modernist in its
practices, especially if viewed as advocacy of truth or as discovering which
side does the better arguing. Debate in general qualifies as a "traditional
(modernist) mode" (Zavarzadeh & Morton, 1991, p. 120) of contesting ideas,
to be contrasted with the postmodern accommodation of differences and
tolerance of unresolved (thereby unresolvable?) disputes. The avowal of in
consistency, therefore, reverberates beyond academic debate. Once incon
sistency is institutionalized, it dissolves the desirability and perhaps even the
possibility of converging viewpoints and stable social relationships. Instead,
perspectives multiplied while remaining incommensurable. The postmodern
praise of contradiction "underlines the insurmountable differences that make
for a lack of social and personal cohesion" (Kuspit, 1990, p. 59). In an
activity that could use greater emphasis on cooperation, why should debate
theory undermine unity by underlining heterology? Debaters, judges, and
coaches must ask themselves whether rejecting the basis of communal values
serves an educational purpose. It seems far more productive to balance prac
tices that foster community with a respect for diversity. Why further isolate
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members of the debate community from one another by enshrining incon
sistency?
Some strains of postmodernism seem to advocate disengagement, an al
most neo-positivistic isolation from all epistemological assumptions. Con
sider the example of art. In privileging the interpreter's response instead of
the work's presentation of an ultimate solution, postmodern art would max
imize interpretive latitude. For this expansion of interpretive possibilities to
occur, "the audience must free itself of all inhibitions and presumptions of
meaning" (Klinkowitz, 1988, p. 5). So far, such shedding of intellectual bag
gage seems to link postmodernism with the tabula rasa view that debate
judges often adopt to prevent them from undue intervention (Harris & Row
land, 1993, p. 31). The argument continues, however. The more radically
postmodernism supposedly breaks with tradition, the more audiences must
sever their ties to traditions that shape attributions of meaning. To maximize
the inventive capacity of debaters, postmodernism would need to gravitate
toward the rejection of all argumentative strictures. Certainly Kramer and
Lang want to prevent this slippery slope, otherwise each debate round would
have to reconstruct argumentation from its very foundations. On the other
hand, it is difficult to see how postmodernism could impose limits on con-
testable territory. To maximize the opportunity for creativity, everything
should be up for debate.
The thoroughly modernist activity of debate is structured according to a
division of ground informed by Aristotelian logic. Most prominently, the dis
tinction between affirmative and negative sides presumes incompatible po
sitions as the basis for forced choice that leads to a decision. Debate actually
emphasizes argumentative incompatibility in order to facilitate choice. The
intolerance of inconsistency is logically and procedurally necessary in a
zero-sum game atmosphere where decisions must be rendered for one side
only. If inconsistency were encouraged as a component of a postmodern
perspective, then counterplans need not be competitive. Furthermore, the
more inconsistency is tolerated, the less reason there would be to vote for
postmodernism as an alternative to the rational methods employed by the
opposing team. As inconsistency becomes more acceptable, it undermines
the grounds for claiming that any argument could qualify as a voting issue.
Ultimately, if inconsistency is desirable, then any particular debate could and
should end in a tie.
Beyond Embracing Paradox and Paradigms
The purpose of this essay extends beyond exploring the explanatory limits
of specific paradigms that have been proposed as models for debate. I aim
to question the necessity of paradigms, especially if the intellectual climate
indeed qualifies as postmodern. Postmodernism introduces a much-needed
note of skepticism regarding the need for and usefulness of paradigms.
The proliferation of paradigms in debate should serve as a warning sign.
Exactly what role do paradigms play? Perhaps more important, what role
should they play? Debate theorists should be wary of force-fitting debates
into paradigms without examining the analogies between debate as it is or
should be practiced and the paradigmatic model (cf. Snider, 1992, p. 321).
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No specific paradigm, be it hypothesis testing, narrativity, policymaking (sys
tems analysis), game theory, stock issues, or postmodernism, offers a deci
sion-making calculus with guidelines sufficient to resolve individual contro
versies. The fundamental problem is that no paradigm does or can set pri
orities among the decision-making criteria. Using cost-benefit analysis as an
example, systems analysis can tell us that benefits should exceed costs. No
form of systems analysis, however, can legitimize a hierarchy among values
that would enable critics to evaluate the relative merits of preserving indi
vidual liberties versus preventing debilitating disease. When it comes to ren
dering decisions in debate rounds, all paradigms eventually collapse into
prioritizing values, a task that no paradigm makes any pretense to address
and a problem that no paradigm successfully resolves.
The inordinate attention devoted to paradigms may contribute to clarifying
the nature of debate, but it also marks debate theory as epistemologically
immature. Toulmin (1972) notes that the realms of inquiry that make the
most obvious and rapid progress toward resolving central issues in their fields
also expend the least effort in examining their own epistemological under
pinnings. This lack of self-examination, far from an avoidance of reflection,
demonstrates confidence in the unity of the field and a shared commitment
among members of that field to address core problems. Toulmin's praise of
these "compact disciplines" (1972, p. 379) relies on the linkage of progress
with outer-directedness, a concern for solving problems facing the field rath
er than the field undergoing a continuous identity crisis. Compact disciplines
look out the window instead of looking in the mirror.
Undue focus on paradigms encourages an epistemological narcissism that
restricts access to substantive issues that could be enlightened through de
bate. It is no coincidence that debate rounds where paradigms form the
argumentative focus attenuate the case-centered arguments in order to dis
pute procedural issues and—sometimes—try to create rules for deciding the
round. In social argumentation, prolonged periods of controversy about the
nature of argumentative activity remain rare. Indeed, Kuhn (1970) points out
that the vast majority of scientific activity occurs during the extended periods
of "normal science," where paradigms are not foregrounded, not questioned,
not the focus of attention. Paradigms come into question only when major
anomalies arise that cannot be explained adequately in the prevailing par
adigm.
Given the conditions under which paradigms do become objects of focus,
why discuss paradigms in debate? As far as I can tell, paradigms are discussed
primarily because there is little or no consensus about exactly what function
debate serves or what status it has, especially in its competitive incarnation.
As Toulmin and Kuhn suggest, concentrating on paradigms means either that
the field is absorbed in a crisis that it cannot resolve under present condi
tions, or that the field is not sufficiently compact to devote attention to what
it should do. Theoretical discussions about debate are dominated by onto-
logical concerns: what debate is, how it should be. The predominance of
these ontological discussions reveals what Toulmin would call the non-dis
ciplinary status of debate. One specific indicator of this situation is "the
absence of a suitable professional organization" (Toulmin, 1972, p. 380) that
would unify members of the debate community by articulating their shared
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concerns and methods for approaching these problems. Instead, the prolif
eration of organizations dealing with academic debate and the continued
posing of ontological questions ("Who are we?") inhibits the establishment
of common goals the debate community might pursue.
A proper application of postmodernism to debate would dissolve the no
tion of paradigms. If the search for paradigms is abandoned or curtailed,
what lessons do postmodernism hold for debate? Postmodernism offers de
bate primarily negations: opposition to unitary evaluative standards and re
jection of scientifically based means of adjudication. From a postmodern
perspective, any attempt to place facts "within some larger, more ambitious
explanatory paradigm—is ignoring the weight of de facto evidence" that
shows the historical failure of grand explanatory schemes (Norris, 1990, p.
7). If a postmodern perspective could be applied to debate, it would not take
the form of a paradigm or other normative structure. Postmodernism might
simply counsel us to recognize our interpretations as limited, thus enabling
political engagement without hegemonic claims to know an ultimate Truth
(Marshall, 1992). Such self-imposed restrictions on the scope of claims would
introduce a welcome tone of modesty into competitive debate rounds.
The choice is not whether or not to "adopt" a postmodern perspective,
but to decide how postmodern conditions could affect the assumptions and
conduct of debate. Postmodernists along the lines of Baudrillard discard the
qualification that contradictions should not be obvious and embrace para
dox. In contrast to Rorty, Baudrillard recommends: "Distrust campaigns of
solidarity at every level," because all sense of unity and permanence is de
signed to disguise the erosion of referentiality (1983, p. 11 On). This strain of
postmodernism abandons criteria for valid argumentation, instead judging
argumentative quality on the aesthetic merits of the rhetorical strategy irre
spective of normative standards (Norris, 1990). The raison d'etre of debate
would become the satisfaction of individual taste, since aesthetics no longer
would have any transcendent grounding in human values or fidelity to any
thing beyond the representation itself. Such a change harbors serious impli
cations. Argumentative acumen is reduced to knowing how to best one's
opponents, so the hope that argumentation can enlighten arguers and au
diences vanishes because enlightenment is illusory.
The political consequences of postmodern debate do not sound enticing,
either. The promise of argumentation serving as an intellectually and socially
liberating force—an agenda adopted by Habermas, for example—relies on
rationally grounded critique that exposes distortion and internal contradic
tion. Without an understanding of what would constitute argumentative prog
ress or communicative value, postmodernism fails to offer grounds or expla
nations of change. In essence, postmodernism sounds the call for political
involvement while leaving a blank slate when called upon to produce a
vision of productive social engagement for intellectuals (McGowan, 1991).
These considerations leave at least two choices for those involved with
academic debate. First, debaters and critics can adopt a postmodern mindset
but at the cost of undermining procedural foundations and social relevance.
Harris and Rowland (1993) note that academic debate already exhibits some
postmodern tendencies, such as in the detachment from analogues and ap
plications beyond the rounds themselves. The independence of debates from
42
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol33/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 39
"real world" concerns such as face validity of arguments bring debate ever
closer to Baudrillard's simulacra, where external reference dissolves. In a
word, academic debate becomes more postmodern the more it grows irrel
evant to the world beyond the round.
On the other hand, the practice of debate might be understood as anith-
etical to postmodern tendencies. In policy debate, how could argumentation
have any significance once the relationship between intellectuals and social
change becomes ill-defined and idiosyncratic? In value debate, how could
values be weighed when the standards for evaluating values have evaporat
ed? In any form of debate, how could decisions be rendered when the very
criteria for making those decisions no longer stand?
Recognizing the influence of postmodernism still can allow for some ex
planation of how agreement could be reached and how decisions could be
justified without appealing to universal, immutable standards. This task is
akin to the project Rorty has undertaken since writing Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature. At the core of postmodern thought lies a concern for re
lationships instead of facts or representations of reality (Klinkowitz, 1988, p.
8). Such a shift in orientation drives Rorty (1979) to reject the epistemological
goal of accurately representing nature. Instead, he envisions epistemology as
a continuing conversation in which claims are posited, tested, and revised
consensually. Worthy as the goal may be, Rorty and others have yet to ex
plore in detail the means for engineering consent and achieving community.
Rorty (1991, p. 174) criticizes Lyotard and Foucault for engaging in pene
trating social critiques without articulating the basis for the "we" of human
solidarity. Debate theorists can take up the same challenge: to elucidate the
symbolic and other means for solidarity that permit rational decision-making.
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REFLECTIONS ON THE 1984 AND 1988




Although they served only limited functions in their origin, party platforms
have a long tradition in American politics. The forerunner of the party plat
form was "an address to the people," simple orations in praise of candidates
and parties (Pomper, 1963). It was not until the 1840 convention when the
Democratic-Republicans, soon to be called Democrats, adopted basic party
principles and labeled them a "platform" (David, Goldman, & Bain, 1960).
Since the 1840 Democratic platform was drafted, many changes have oc
curred in the complexity, design, and functions of these party statements.
Due to the rapid dissemination of information to the public during the middle
and later 1900's, controversial issues received much more immediate atten
tion; political parties had to address many people and their concerns. For
example, in 1840, the Democratic platform was only 400 words in length,
but by 1968 the Democratic platform had grown to be 20,000 words long;
by 1984 the Democratic platform was about twice that size. Despite over
150 years of evolution in platform construction and convention modification,
platforms have always served as important rhetorical opportunities for polit
ical parties to shape a vision of their political community. This vision results
from, as Smith (1992) suggests, an "ideological compromise" among a par
ty's factions, coming together to create a unified message. These documents,
as a result, make important ideological distinctions between parties for vot
ers.
Arguably, party platforms are considered successful if they persuade inter
est groups and individual voters to support their candidates. Organized
groups have to be motivated to give financial assistance and develop large
voting blocks; likewise, individual voters, including both the electoral college
and the mainstream public, need to be promised various benefits in return
for support. Appealing to a diverse populous is a monumental task requiring
many ideas and plans, and understanding one specific way that partial iden
tification is achieved, particularly through a platform from a political party
known for its wide-stretched arms, may shed insight into how strategic that
party must be. The 1984 and 1988 Democratic F^rty platforms serve as two
documents with a similar goal yet radically different means. Analyzing the
way each set out and executed that goal serves as the gist of this essay,
suggesting the need for further inspection into platform communication.
Platform Analysis: Approach and Focus
Many scholars in the recent past (Cooke, 1956; Johnson and Porter, 1973;
Pomper, 1963 and 1970; Sorauf, 1968) make note of platforms but all have
one major shortcoming: they do not focus on the rhetorical nature of these
SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 33, Nos. 1-4 (1996), 42-58.
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party documents. Most currently, Smith (1989 & 1992) conducted such anal
yses. Utilizing a narrative perspective he, first, compared the two 1984 major
party platforms and found that even though both party platforms had similar
structure and addressed similar issues, their stories were radically different,
an obvious conclusion. Second, he compared the 1988 Democratic and
Republican platforms emphasizing ideological compromise within the re
spective parties, thus finding unique stories for each party, a similar study as
his first. What may be interesting to consider beyond just what the story is,
is how the story is told and regarded by the public, a somewhat risky yet
unexplored endeavor, but one that is encouraged by Miller and Stiff (1993)
who promote research in deceptive communication, specifically that which
deals with a more interactive paradigm "rather than focusing on just, let us
say, a liar or liee" (p. 104).
Further focusing and justifying this study is the fact that the 1988 Demo
cratic convention marked a turning point in that party's construction of a
very short 3,000-word platform. Prior to that year, the Democrats produced
lengthy platforms, such as the 1984 45,000-word party promise. As Smith
(1992) points out, the 1988 Democrats issued a platform "that rivaled their
initial 'address' in that the document was a mere seven pages long" (p. 532).
In 1992, the Democrats produced an approximately 5,000-word platform,
highlighting a trend toward brevity.
Before continuing, a concern should be addressed. One may argue that
post-McGovern-Fraiser Commission platforms, those after the 1968 refor
mations, have been diminished due to the fact that the party presidential
candidate is already chosen prior to the final draft of the platform, thus al
lowing it to be tailored to that candidate. However, such a narrow-sighted
argument neglects to account for what Smith says about contemporary—and
for that matter older—platforms:
Few political entities hold regional hearings in order to solicit their constit
uents' opinions and mold those perspectives into a single expression of re
solve that is eventually ratified by the membership. Platforms, then, reflect
the ideological diversity of the institutions that produce them as they facilitate
the syntheses of interests necessary to sustain their creators and, in turn, the
American political system (p. 532).
No matter when the candidate Is chosen, the platform must still bring to
gether factions lest the drafters offend too many groups—an elementary po
litical faux pas.
With that out of the way, an approach to analyze the anomalous 1988
Democratic platform should be one that focuses on what brevity, or better
yet ambiguity, in language does for a pluralistic institution. As Romper (1963)
write, "The degree of ambiguity [in platforms] depends on party strategy"
(p. 69). Allowing for multiple interpretations may be crucial for a party to
achieve unity, the primary function of a platform. Ambiguity, which allows
for multiple interpretations of a text, may also include vague language which,
usually, precludes a specific reading altogether. Vague, or unclear, language
perhaps can lead to ambiguity depending on how the receiver comes to
understand the message or is told how to understand the language. A sender
may, for example, tell different receivers how to interpret a vague message
differently, thus, giving way to multiple readings. These varying interpreta-
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tions could, perhaps, allow for the public to identify with a party. Identifi
cation, by way of Burke's (1950) definition, is a way of matching "A" to "B"
which are not identical but have interest together. A body is identified by its
properties, and in the case of rhetoric. Burke tells us that "A" may persuade
"B" only insofar as "A" can talk "B's" language by speech, gesture, tonality,
order, image, attitude, idea, identifying "A's" ways with "B's" ways (p. 55).
Simply put, political identification results when a politician's opinions and
needs adapt to a public's opinions and needs. This is a process of matching
a rhetor's cause with the audience's interests.
Borrowing from Cheney (1983), identification is "compensatory to divi
sion" (p. 145). That is, the major requisites for identification to occur include
"segregation and congregation" (p. 155). A party and voters may be brought
together, in part, by a platform. Yet, identification through ambiguity cannot
be found in Cheney's classificatory system of identification: common ground,
an overt link between sender and receiver; antithesis, uniting against a com
mon enemy; or the transcendent "we." A case could perhaps be made for
one or all of these approaches to be found in any particular platform, but
the concern of this study focuses on how ambiguity, or lack of it, affects
identification between a party and its constituencies, thus giving way to a
sense of consubstantiality.
Burke says that once "A" is identified with "B," they become consubstan-
tial. In other words, if identification is successful, a sense of substantive to
getherness is achieved, such as a viable political community. An integrated
or consubstantial body, with varying degrees of separation, forms to complete
tasks in pursuit of common goals.
This notion of substance, as Durham (1980) suggests, is more than the
relation between a symbol and thing or idea, a referential function some
scholars might promote. Durham agrees that Burke's concept of substance is
much more and should deal with ambiguity. He states:
Substantiation is thus a process of relating one order of experience to a higher
or lower order. Amhiguity is the spark of contact between higher and lower.
.  . . Amhiguity fires the mind and illuminates the world. It is the quality of
language that makes the verb mightier than the surd (p. 360).
The union of substantive togetherness, created by effective identification is
beyond just a matter of reading an agreement on common symbols; it is a
teleological outcome that ultimately creates a relationship or structure. Burke
himself argues that substantiation "... occurs at the point of contact be
tween the finite and the infinite" (Durham, 1980, p. 355). Identification
through ambiguity may help us to understand how a diverse political insti
tution may obtain a sense of consubstantiality with a diverse populous.
Such an analysis, as Edieman (1964) would suggest, must operate on at
least two levels simultaneously. A critic must examine how political actions
get, or at least promise, groups things they want and what these actions mean
to those groups and how such actions are placated or aroused by them. Of
course, identifying with multiple audiences is perhaps the greatest problem
in political communication (Hart 1983), but that is just what a platform does
on two levels. Analyzing interest group promises in platforms may be done
by asking questions dealing with statements of recognition about these
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groups in a platform, the language choices of those statements, and the Im
pact of such statements on the Interests. An Interest that reflects a party's line
of thought and has the ability to give substantial financial and/or voting sup
port would. In all likelihood, be mentioned, but promises made to Interests
can be somewhat problematic for a party In that other voters and groups
may be turned away If they felt alienated. Politicians may use ambiguity In
platform communication as a strategic device to appeal to traditional party
interests without alienating others. As Bennett (1975) says, "[Politicians must]
locate the most universally satisfying definitions for potentially alienating
events" (p. 23). This creates what Elsenberg (1984) calls a "unified diversity"
that allows groups to maintain Identity under a unified party umbrella. Clear
ly, then, the positive or negative response of a particular Interest becomes
important to consider.
Platforms must. In addition to Interest appeal, attract mainstream voters.
Broader national Issues that concern the diverse populous and not just a
single Interest become Important to consider. For example. If a platform ex
plicitly states that Its party officials support a five percent Income tax In
crease, many voters would probably be turned away by such a blunt remark.
However, a platform plank that says Its party officials believe In a tax system
that Is fair to all leaves much unsaid. What Is a fair tax system? WIN the party
Increase or decrease taxes? Such statements In a platform keep a party's
officials and candidates from binding themselves with specific, unpopular,
and perhaps variable opinions.
With a perspective for analysis established, one final note must be revealed
about Identification and consubstantlality. Some may approach these terms
as a "means to end" relationship. That Is not always the case. Identification
Itself may be a means of an end, wholly or partially, as Nichols would agree
(Brummett, 1993, p. 8). So It will be Interesting to find out the Impact of
platforms, particularly the 1984 and 1988 Democratic platforms.
The 1984 and 1988 Democratic Party Platforms: Background and Analysis
The Jeffersonian party was the forbearer of the Democratic Party, and It
became the party of the common person, including "the frontier settler, small
farmer, unskilled laborer, craftsman, enlisted soldier. Immigrant, debtor, poor,
and disenfranchised" (Goldman, 1986, p. 58). Because of such a collection
Kayden and Mahe (1985) easily argue that Democrats have a long history of
trouble creating unity—especially in the last half of this century. Diverse
constituencies usually spark a great deal of dissent In large organizations and
parties like the Democrats (Rutland, 1979). As Kutner (1987) states, "The
party of all the people, which made room for factory workers, urban bosses,
uptown reformers. Southern racists, socialist intellectuals, rural populists, di
verse ethnic minorities, and more, was bitterly divided over Idealogy, class,
cultural style, and party rules" (p. 3).
The 1984 Democratic platform serves as a model contemporary party plat
form that sought unity. It contained five sections: the Preamble; Economic
Growth (Chapter One), Prosperity and Jobs (Chapter Two); Justice, Dignity,
and Opportunity (Chapter Three); and Peace, Security and Freedom (Chapter
Four). Each chapter has multiple subsections that explain policies, ridicule
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Republican rule, and present Democratic alternatives (Democratic Party Plat
form, 1984). The chair of the platform committee. New York Representative
Geraldine Ferraro, appealed to platform drafters to keep specific plans of
action in the document at a minimum due to "complaints from state and
local elected officials that they needed a platform that they could actually
run on" (p. 5). However, as Treadwell (1984) stated, "The new Democratic
platform is the longest ever submitted, reflecting a growing trend to accom
modate as many desires of particular interest groups as possible ..." (p. 5).
Soon after Mondale lost, party leaders met in the Virgin Islands to discuss
the state of their party. Party leaders in the Islands sought to discuss how to
gain control of their masses and steer away from divided interests. This was
a goal for the next major presidential election and the next party platform.
The official 1988 Democratic platform, "The Restoration of Competence
and the Revival of Hope," was an attempt to articulate a new vision of the
party's principles. This platform is not like other contemporary party docu
ments; it contains just over 3,000 words—15 times smaller than the docu
ment created four years earlier, and the document does not have the outlined
structure found in previous platforms. Of course, one must remember that
quantity does not necessarily make quality. In the case of the 1988 Demo
cratic platform, quality of content seemed to be a major issue.
Democratic platform committee chairperson, former Michigan Governor
James Blanchard, made clear his goal for the new image of the party in their
official document. He said, "I want to come up with something that is read
able, hard-hitting and substantive, and not a laundry list of demands by this
or that association or group" (Love, 1988, p. 12).
The 1988 Democratic Party platform drew much attention from the media
and political leaders—even more so than past platforms because of its am
biguous nature. Editorials had mixed reviews of the 1988 Democratic plat
form. The Chicago Tribune stated: "All political platforms come sugar-coated,
but his year, the Democrats have turned their platform, the shortest in half a
century, into baklava—layers of puff pastry ..." (Beck, 1988, p. 17). The
New York Times had another view: "The 1988 Democratic platform repre
sents a tactical triumph for Governor Dukakis. Rarely has a nominee left a
platform fight less burdened with potentially embarrassing baggage" ("Rain
less Platform," p. 24). Political leaders also had mixed reviews. Jesse Jackson,
one the major critics of the platform, voiced his concerns about the docu
ment by stating, "I do not think that bland is beautiful. People ought to be
specific, ought to make promises, ought to make commitments, ought to gain
a mandate" (Margolis, 1988, June 27, p. 5). However, other political leaders
found this platform to be rather remarkable in the way it prompted unity in
the party; there were only two floors fights (both defeated) after the platform
was drafted. Bill Holayter, the chief political operative of the machinists
union, witnessed the drafting of the platform and said, "I think the last time
a platform committee was so peaceful was 1944" (p. 1).
Although an analysis of these documents could fill many pages, space
forces brevity here. Therefore, two topic areas, one concerning an interest
group, blacks, and the other concerning the public at large, taxes, may serve
as examples to conduct this analysis. The black interest group will be used
50
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol33/iss1/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 47
during the two platform analyses because this interest is historically large
and powerful, illustrating a faction with stability.
Even more interesting was the newly forming relationship between blacks
and the Democratic Party. Mondale, in 1984, followed party tradition by
storing up the " 'Roosevelt coalition,' consisting ... of labor, blacks, Jews,
ethics and the poor..." (Romper, 1985, p. 44). Unfortunately, Mondale ran
up against the new mood of the disenchanted black bloc; even though the
Republican Party was not a viable choice for blacks, their enthusiasm for
Mondale and the Democrats was highly questionable. As McWilliams (Rom
per) notes, "Jesse Jackson campaigned in 1984 on the premise that blacks
should approach the Democrats as outsiders, a pressure group that cannot
be 'taken for granted' " (p. 169). For Dukakis in 1988, the situation remained
unstable. While Dukakis responded with reconciliation and "healing from
the wounds of Reaganism," Jackson's divisive tactics from 1984 continued
(Blumenthal, p. 200). Jackson's rhetoric echoed black America, focusing on
what social scientist William Wilson in his book. The Declining Significance
of Race, described as the blacks' "cycle of pain" (p. 200).
Aside from the current woeful relationship between blacks and Democrats
was the broader negative public rage Democrats had concerning economics,
chiefly taxes, in 1984, a Los Angeles Times poll identified taxes as one of
the top eight issues that concerned all Americans; five of the top eight were
economic issues (Romper, 1985, p. 96). The deficit and inflation skyrocketed;
voters, many of them reluctantly agreeing with higher taxes, blamed Dem
ocrats (Romper, 1985, p. 81). Four years later, Lee Atwater, when asked by
author William Carrick, identified the top issues in the election: "taxes and
national defense" (Runkel, 1989, p. 113). As Blumenthal notes, Reagan's
"military buildup and regressive tax cuts had fostered an unprecedented def
icit" and with looming public fear of higher taxes, politicians had to tread
water or, as George Bush found out later, drown in statement like "no new
taxes" (p. 336). Examining this timely issue of taxes may reflect the manner
in which the platforms deal with broader mainstream topics.
One major issue that was heavily debated by Jackson was the elimination
of the runoff primary used in nine southern states and Oklahoma. Jackson
held that runoff primaries "hurt black office seekers in the South by forcing
them to get an absolute majority of the popular vote even when they placed
first in the initial election" (Shogan and Mayer, 1984, p. 3). The debate over
this issue turned into a floor fight and initiated much division at the 1984
Democratic Convention before the platform was ratified by delegates. Jack
son and his supporters pushed for the Rarty's support for a ban on runoff
primaries, but they met with opposition. White Southern Democrats, includ
ing Mondale supporter and general campaign chairperson Bert Lance, said
that such a clause "would be very costly to their region [the South]" ("In
Shaping," 1984, p. 11). As such, the proposal was rejected by delegates,
1,500 to 1,253, but the final clause agreed upon was still somewhat specific
in a 1,000-word plus section of voting rights. Even though Jackson's wish to
explicitly promote a runoff ban was defeated, the platform did promise stud
ies into the primaries. This section on voting rights concluded by giving
specifics on how the Justice Department would be implemented to investi
gate questionable voting practices, how the Democratic Rarty would imple-
51
et al.: Volume 33, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1995/Winter 1996/Spring 1996/
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
48 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
ment a "massive, nationwide campaign to increase regulation and voting
participation," and other such items (p. 22).
Black interests were also concerned with various civil rights issues such
as affirmative action and quotas. The majority opinion wanted the platform
to state that even though the party rejected quotas it "strongly reaffirms its
long-standing commitment to the eradication of discrimination . .. though
the use of affirmative action goals and time-tables" ("In Shaping," 1984, p.
11). Minority interests, led by blacks, wanted the platform to say that the
party endorsed quotas as a whole but "opposes quotas which are inconsis
tent with the principles of our country" (p. 11). After a great deal of debate
and emotional outbursts, the two camps agreed on a clause that read, "The
Party reaffirms its long-standing commitment to the eradication of discrimi
nation in all aspects of American life through the use of affirmative action,
goals, timetables, and other verifiable measurements ..." (p. 20). That
change, according to many, was little more than a poor play on words, for
as Walter Fauntroy, a delegate from Washington, D.C., said, the phrase '"oth
er verifiable measures . . . means quotas without using the word" (p. 10).
The Platform went on to promise a Democratic administration would "re
verse the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Grove City
College case in order to prohibit any financial assistance to an educational
institution that discriminated against minorities" (p. 20). In addition, the plat
form specified that "Democratic Administration will return the Commission
on civil rights to an independent status and increase its funding" (p. 20).
There is also a section on sickle-cell anemia, a promise that many blacks
wanted. The platform promises "that a Democratic Administration will re
store the National Sickle-Cell Anemia Control act . . . " (p. 23).
Despite some very specific promises to blacks, total unity among the party
and the black interest was questionable due to the heated debate over the
hotly contested issues of runoff primaries and quotas. After the election,
many Democrats voiced concern over racial topics—those specifically deal
ing with blacks. Mississippi Democratic Chairperson Steven Patterson said in
regard to the low number of white Southern voter support, "The Democratic
Party has become the party of the needy, their platform one of redividing the
pie" (Peterson and Russakoff, 1984, November 12, p. 16). He added that
Democrats failed to attract the black vote because the party did not offer
them exactly what they wanted. Alabama Governor George C. Wallace said
in regard to the low white Democratic support that the party must "start
paying more attention to the average citizen and to begin to reflect the think
ing of those who work for a living, pay the taxes, fight the wars and hold
this country together" (p. 16). Black issues in the platform failed to contribute
to Democratic unity, and the platform did not allow for effective identifica
tion to occur between blacks and the party. The platform attempted to com
bine the party's needs and black's needs—a necessity for identification. How
ever, the specificity in the language only turned away party officials and
blacks by attempting to reflect inconsistent needs such as the different opin
ions on quotas. Quantification, such as voter response to individual issues
in relation to specific passages in the platform as read by the voters or told
to them by their leaders or the media, could be desirable at this point, but
aside from the fact that such microscopic statistical research is unavailable.
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unmanageable, or inane one must strongly consider that when party officials
such as Patterson, Wallace, and Jackson, voice opposition, their faithful do
also. Of course, general statistical research showing black party affiliation
and voter turnout polls would illustrate little.
The 1988 Democratic platform is not as specific as the 1984 document
concerning interest representation. Important interest groups are scattered
throughout the 1988 document, scarcely given mention of specific policies
and/or action with respect to the factions' wishes that are given. Paragraph
nine of the platform reads: "We believe that we honor our multi cultural
heritage by assuring equal access to government services, employment,
housing, business enterprise, and education to every citizen regardless of
race, sex, national origin, religion, age, handicapping condition or sexual
orientation . . ."(p. 3). The platform goes on to explain that the present ad
ministration's party is "increasingly monolithic both racially and culturally"
(p. 3). These statements allowed Democrats to portray themselves as a party
that held true to its constituencies; however, the platform gave no specific
promises to any of the groups mentioned. The platform merely states that
the party "believes" that all Americans deserve equal treatment—a statement
that few politicians could argue against. Despite a high degree of ambiguity,
the platform does reveal a few points to its major constituencies. For ex
ample, blacks are mentioned in the 1988 platform: "Our [the public] ma
chinery for civil rights enforcement . . . should be rebuilt and vigorously
utilized ... the voting rights of all minorities should be protected, the recent
surge in hate violence and negative stereotyping combated . . . and the lin
gering effects of past discrimination eliminated by affirmative action, includ
ing goals, timetables, and procurement set-asides" (p. 3 & 4). These passages
are very ambiguous when compared to the issues covered in the 1984 Dem
ocratic platform. Whereas the 1984 sections on blacks say that the party
"will return the commission on civil rights to an independent status and
increase funding," the 1988 platform says that public machinery to combat
discrimination "should be rebuilt." No specific names or promises are given
to blacks in the 1988 version; the document simply says that something
"should" be done rather than saying we "will" do it.
These general comments in reference to black groups prevented division
from taking center stage replacing it with a unified body. Again, as with the
1984 analysis, we find strong qualitative evidence supporting this claim. For
example, Richard Hatcher, former major of Gary, Indiana and a Jackson sup
porter, said, "This meeting [platform adoption by delegates] has some of us
absolutely surprised. Ninety-five percent of all the issues that came up . . .
have been resolved in a peaceful and unified way" (Dillin, 1988, June 27,
p. 3). Other Democrats, outside of the black interest group, were also pleased
about platform's success and the unity between blacks and the party. Florida
Senator Bob Graham said that blacks and Democrats were truly united and
committed themselves to win togther in November (Rosenbaum, 1988, June
27).
Republicans did not have much to attack in the platform or in Dukakis'
campaign because the language in the platform functioned in three very
important ways. The language was ambiguous enough to, one, pledge sup
port to interests, and, two, ensure their support. Furthermore, the language
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was ambiguous enough to prevent the opposition from going through a laun
dry list of promises and pointing out that the Democratic Party is a body of
divided parts. Arguably, the 1988 platform helped in allowing for successful
identification to occur between the party and its interests to take front stage
while pushing division backstage as the many testimonials make clear. Of
course, as noted earlier, interest groups are not all that must identify with a
platform. It is necessary to consider broader national issues in both platforms
in order to examine how the language of each document created a vision
of a political community that appealed to mainstream voters. One very im
portant traditional mainstream issue that the 1984 Democratic platform ad
dressed is taxes. Traditionally, the Democrats have been labeled the party of
more taxes (Rutland, 1979), and their 1984 platform supports this tradition.
The platform states:
By broadening the tax base, simplifying the tax code, lowering rates, and
eliminating unnecessary, unfair, and unproductive deductions and tax ex
penditures, we can raise the revenues we need and promote growth without
increasing the burden on average taxpayers . . . We will cap the effect of the
Reagan tax cuts for wealthy Americans and enhanced the progressiveness of
our personal income tax code, limiting the benefits of the third year for the
Reagan tax cuts to the level of those with incomes of less than $60,000 . . .
Under the Reagan Administration, the rate of taxation on corporations has
been so substantially reduced that they are not contributing their fair share
to federal revenues. We believe there should be a 15% minimum corporate
tax (p. 6).
The 1984 Democratic platform is very specific as to how a Democratic Ad
ministration would deal with the issue of taxes. During his campaign Mon-
dale stressed the need for higher taxes and supported a tax-increase propos
al—a move that Reagan countered with attacks throughout the Presidential
race (Roberts, 1984). The specificity of language in the platform gave little
room for any maneuverability in Mondale's rhetoric concerning taxes.
The specific plans of action in the platform did not set well with many.
Roberts (1984), an economist from Georgetown University, wrote that al
though Democrats illustrated the essence of leadership by proposing some
thing different than Republicans, such statements were probably not what
mainstream American voters want to hear. Telling voters that they will pay
more taxes if a certain party or individual is given power may result in po
litical suicide. As TIME commented, "Mondale has to preach sacrifice, a
sermon difficult to deliver from any political pulpit" (Andersen, Bolte, and
Yang, 1984, p. 21). Peter Peterson, former Secretary of Commerce and one
of the founding members of the Bipartisan Budget Coalition, said that such
specific proposals from Democrats turned away needed support because of
specificity concerning higher taxes (Berstein, 1984). Detailed language, as
found in the 1984 Democratic platform, limits political mobility, and change,
according to Burke (1950), Eisenberg (1984), and Edelman (1977), is crucial
for politicians in potentially dividing situations.
In contrast, the 1988 Democratic Platform covered a wide range of issues,
both domestic and foreign, but this party document has much less depth
than the 1984 version. A traditional and long-standing issue to the public in
1988, just as in 1984, was taxes. The 1988 platform mentions taxes but once
in the whole document, and it reads, "Investing in America and reducing
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the deficit requires that the wealthy and corporations pay their fair share . .
(p. 2). This passage was successful in that Dukakis was not as restrained on
the issue as Mondale had been in 1984; the 1988 nominee did not have to
tell mainstream voters what they apparently did not want to hear in 1984
and arguably so in 1988. Dukakis was allowed to avoid the subject of higher
taxes and stress his tax laws enforcement program to control the deficit (Beck,
1988, p. 17). This move was crucial to gain mainstream support. Janice Thur
mond, an Athens, Georgia lawyer and Jackson supporter, stated that the
move to remain ambiguous concerning taxes would only help Dukakis:
We need him [Dukakis] to give an answer that is believable where he is not
accused of being a 'tax-and-spend' Democrat. It is irresponsible for us not
to give him an answer so that he can look any Republican straight in the
eye and say, "I am not a tax-and-spend Democrat, I am a raise-revenue
Democrat' " (p. 20).
As Rachelle Horowitz, political director of the American Federation of Teach
ers, said, "One of the reasons I support Michael Dukakis is that as a governor
and as a President he is the kind of man who will not tax and spend, tax
and spend in the way the Democrats have been accused of doing before"
(Shogan, 1988, June 12, p. 20). Dukakis never backed himself into a corner
by saying that he would or would not raise taxes; whereas, the 1984 plat
form's and Mondale's forced frankness did not set well with the public. Du
kakis avoided specifics about reducing the deficit other than his idea of ag
gressive tax enforcement (Barrett, Beckwith, and Riley, 1988, p. 26). This
latitude of meaning seemed one effective manner in bringing back many
mainstream voters Democrats lost in 1984. Lawrence Katz, a criminal lawyer
from Prescott, Arizona and a Democrat who was disillusioned with the party
for over 20 years, said, "The Democratic Party is getting its act together. It's
better organized" (Schmich, 1988, p. 1). As far as broad-based appeal, TIME
(Barrett, 1988) observed that middle American voters—especially the Reagan
Democrats—were not as divided as they were in 1984, and they began to
identify with the Democrats once again. One factor that seemed to help this
new found unity was the platform in that it was non-restrictive and more
inclusive because of its ambiguity.
So, the 1988 Democratic Platform seemed to achieve a stronger sense of
identification as compared to the 1984 version. But what of this "matching"
of causes and interests? How did unambiguous and ambiguous language
impact the party and its supporters during the respective elections? Those
questions strike at the heart of analyzing the "offspring of the parents," as
Burke would put it, or the sense of being substantially one.
Consubstantiality: Democratic Political Communities
What is of importance to platform analysis is how a platform functions to
create a political community formed by public and party unity. The 1984
platform merely reflected a torn and disunited party without a clear national
vision for two major reasons. First, interest groups got their wish lists, such
as the case with black interests, and the Democrats were perceived as a
party trapped by interests. Wben the election was over and Mondale had
lost, Arizona Governor Bruce Babbit commented on the Democratic Party's
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image. He said that the party was in an identity crisis composed of a loose
confederation of interests unable to fully unite under a guiding set of issues
and principles—an image forged and reinforced in their platform. Second,
the party platform failed to allow mainstream Americans to identify with the
party concerning broader national issues. The language of the platform was
too specific, such as the plank on taxes, and it did not provide for identifi
cation to occur between the party's principles and mainstream voters creating
obstacles to consubstantiality. Mondale advisor Richard Moe commented af
ter the 1984 loss: "The party is in transition because the country is in tran
sition. The Republicans understand this better and they're setting the national
political agenda" (Dickenson, 1984, p. 6). Traditional issue representation
has been a long-standing mark of the Democratic Party (Goldman, 1986),
but this tradition, as reflected in their platform, restrained the party from
adapting to a changing nation and contributed to loss of support. Language
specificity can result in the breakdown of a pluralistic political community.
On the other hand, the 1988 Democratic platform functioned successfully
for Democrats, and it helped the party and public achieve a sense of con-
substantiality by producing a viable political community in three very im
portant ways. First, the platform was ambiguous enough so that the candi
dates remained relatively in agreement concerning potentially divisive issues.
Since the platform did not get specific in any areas, Dukakis was shielded
from potentially alienating situations such as the issue of taxes. Jackson, the
runner-up in the nomination, was pleased with the platform because his
views were not explicitly rejected in the document. After all, it is more pleas
ing to have nothing said about an unpopular position one may hold instead
of a blunt rejection. For example, Dukakis and Jackson had different views
on taxes. Dukakis built much of his campaign, both before and after his
nomination, on how he could help reduce the deficit by enforcing existing
tax laws more strictly. Michael Barns, a former Maryland Representative and
platform monitor for Dukakis, said, "We [Dukakis campaign] won't accept
a tax increase [in the platform]" (Shogan, 1988, June 12, p. 1). Jackson, on
the other hand, called for tax increases to help solve the deficit problem.
His platform monitor, Norton, said in reference to a tax hike proposal in the
platform, "We can't drop that" (p. 1). However, after the vague statements
were revealed in the final platform as illustrated earlier, both candidates were
pleased by the language (Apple, 1988 and "Democratic Bargaining," 1988,
June 14). In fact, Norton said shortly after the ratification of the platform that
the Jackson camp could accept such platform ambiguity rather than an out
right rejection of their stand ("Democratic Bargaining" June 14). The lan
guage of the platform, in essence, allowed the two candidates to keep their
individual national visions within the context of the larger party vision re
vealed in the platform.
Second, the 1988 Democratic platform appealed to traditional interests in
a way that reflected a unified whole that was acceptable to both interests
and the party. Bill Galston, a Democratic consultant, said, "In 1984, Mon
dale had every group with a letter head hammering on him. Those groups
have been much less vociferous this year; 1984 was a chastening experience
for all concerned" (Broder, 1988, July 17, p. 1). Once platform drafters put
out the word that no interest groups would be given wish lists in the party
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platform, self-restraint by interests kept the document from sagging under the
weight of over-specific planks. Alvin Fromm, director of the Democratic
Leadership Council, said, "The government party [of the Democrats] has
defeated the constituencies party . . . [Democrats] whose priority is the gov
ernance of the general society [defeated those] whose priority was a specific
cause" (Margolis, 1988, July 20, p. 12). Ambiguous language functioned
successfully in creating a national vision by not giving in to the many specific
lists and plans of actions of the interests but still recognizing their existence.
Democrats definitely needed to keep and enhance traditional support, but
they also needed to attract middle American voters in order to win the pres
idency. The party could no longer ignore the growing homogenization of the
country.
Third, the 1988 Democratic platform appealed to mainstream voters, and
it gave them a platform they could identify with and accept. For example,
the platform did not contain a list of expensive proposals concerning national
issues—a move that proved successful. Republicans traditionally accuse
Democrats of being big spenders (Ware, 1985), so platform drafters avoided
any direct proposals to increase budgets—something the 1984 drafters did
not do. The platform contextualized important party issues without being too
specific thus allowing political maneuverability for Dukakis during the pres
idential bid. This move also allowed protection from Republican attacks
about the costs of proposals. Chuck Robb, former Virginia governor, praised
the platform drafters and Dukakis for focusing on mainstream issues. Robb
added that Dukakis "came closer to running a general-election approach
during the election than any Democrat in a long time" (Broder, 1988, July
17, p. 26). The language in the platform was instrumental in the way it
shaped a Democratic political reality that did not portray the party as a
stagnant and unchanging body of old principles. It was ambiguous enough
so as not to reflect a party of unwanted and outdated policies giving way for
Dukakis to shape his own policies during the campaign that could please
mainstream voters within the context of a broader, less defined party vision.
So why did the Democrats fail in 1988? I dare not argue an either/or
fallacy, that ambiguity will equal success and its corollary. One must keep
in mind the variance of identification among groups. Two people may "come
together" on a few issues, many issues, or no issues. Ambiguity may foster
a stronger union given the right circumstances, but differentiation may still
be stronger than any integration. Was consubstantiality reached? That is dif
ficult to argue as one must recall what "Nichols says about 'means and ends.'
A platform is never the end of an election; it is part of a process, part of the
means to an end. Still, it is also part of an end of a separate process, the
rallying of constituencies.
What is interesting about this analysis, and hopefully future studies, is how
the relationship between voting audiences and a party, through one partic
ular channel of communication (a platform), highlights shifts in party ideol
ogy or at least the presentation of that ideology. Studies may illuminate the
nature of the evolving nature of constituencies and their representation in
platform communication. Further, as this study suggests by examining these
two platforms, scholars might focus on how audience targeting, appealing
to a diverse populace at once with one simple message, is arguably more
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effective than audience segmentation, appealing to a diverse populace at
once with one message composed of separate appeals for each group, in
given situations.
These political communities of 1984 and 1988, though both on the losing
side, were formed differently—especially in regard to their respective plat
forms. Perhaps most interesting is how the 1988 platform utilized what some
may perceive as an unethical rhetorical tactic, ambiguity, and this strategy
is worthy of a few final comments.
Conclusion
Huntington (1985) says that a political party may choose one or a com
bination of two strategies in an election. He states; "It [a party] can attempt
to reach out to broaden its appeal ... Or it can attempt to reach down, to
intensify its appeal to groups normally identified with it... " (p. 69). Dem
ocratic platform drafters in 1984 attempted to reach down and pay less at
tention to broader appeals, while the drafters in 1988 took a broader ap
proach. The political community created by the 1984 platform was restricted
by the direct and unambiguous language in that document. This analysis
found that the 1984 platform drafters did have a choice of linguistic features
early in their project, but once they gave in to certain groups, their choices
were limited as they were forced to give specific promises and detailed plans
which resulted in a breakdown of their political community. As Ben Watten-
berg, chairman of the coalition for a Democratic Majority, said, the more
the 1984 drafting committee and Mondale gave into Gary Hart, Jesse Jackson
and others, the more the party was hurt ("The Differences" 1984, p. 74).
The language of the 1988 Democratic platform was manipulated to affect
the public's decision-making, and public interests were held in some degree
of check. Democratic platform drafters in 1988 achieved this by keeping
their platform general and ambiguous. Former Michigan Governor Blan-
chard, said:
We've talked with women's groups, with civil rights groups, with the AFL-
CIO, and with teachers' unions, and they all say, 'Your idea of a statement
of principles is great, but if you get specific, then we're going to have to have
our lists. We're not going to let somebody else come in there and get their's
and we don't get ours' (Love, 1988, p. 12).
This strategy to keep the 1988 platform as unspecific as possible while still
representing important Democratic interests and major issues was a risk, but
the public seemed to accept the platform drafters' strategy more easily in
1988 than they did in 1984 probably because the loss in 1984 was such a
blow to all involved. As Jim Bloom, a top Democrat and aide to former San
Francisco mayor Dianne Feinstein, said in regard to the mellow mood among
interests and the party, "Amazing! What is this, the Republican F^rty? I hav
en't seen this kind of harmony since Mitch Miller" (Dillin, 1988, p. 3). An
aide to defeated Democratic Presidential candidate Albert Gore, Jr., Roy
Neel, said that the platform's approval was very calm, and everyone left
"with good feelings" (p. 3). Indeed, the ambiguous language of the 1988
Democratic platform seemed to allow for the public to identify with the party
without requiring specific commitments. The 1988 Democratic platform.
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then, helped contribute to the formation of a viable political community by
achieving a state of consubstantiation. As the Christian Science Monitor {\ng-
werson, 1988, June 22) stated, "The hallmark of convention '88 turned out
to be unity and togetherness. There were no rules fights, no credentials fights,
and only two platforms minority planks were brought to a floor vote" (p.
14).
In sum, it is important to note that the 1988 platform was not the only
means used to create unity. Other factors surely played roles in this party
image. However, the platform did contribute to the formation of a viable
political community in the way it allowed the public to identify with the
party. Highly ambiguous language in platforms, such as that found in the
1988 Democratic platform, may be successful when it creates a party image
that the public can identify with, accept, and support. After all. Burke (1950)
says that political rhetoric may reassure the public and allay their fears and
resentment: "What handier linguistic resource could a rhetorician want than
an ambiguity whereby he can say 'The state of affairs is substantially such-
and such,' instead of having to say 'The state of affair is not such-and-such'"
(p. 52).
But what of the ethical ramifications of ambiguity in a platform and, for
that matter, other political communication? How can one justify strategic
ambiguity, what some researchers of deception and ethics would regard as
a form of lying, purposely creating multiple interpretations so as not having
to be specific. As Miller and Stiff (1993) argue, very few scholars would say
it is never justifiable to deceive. They state: ". . . even though many pay lip
service to the ideal rule of absolute truth, few argue that there are no ex
ceptions to it" (p. 2). For example, pledging "no new taxes" is extreme, but
such a statement should not be "cast in stone." Change is inevitable; policies
in politics and the greater society change. Timeless accusations, or static
evaluations, of a politician or a political body's platform are detrimental to
our governing system.
So, is ambiguity the solution to sidestep static evaluations? It may seem,
although the shift of our society from "norms of honesty to norms of deceit"
(Miller and Stiff, 1993, p. 4) when regarding political communication seems
itself ambiguous when looking at history. Nevertheless, most would agree
that "the need for an informed populace and the debate about issues is
threatened by deceptive communication" (p. 5). Such a "chicken or the egg"
issue goes beyond the scope of this study, but given the social context of
current American politics, ambiguity may indeed be a justifiable means. Mil
ler and Stiff argue that a sender has a choice, to deceive or not to do so,
and an audience, especially current American society, has a level of moti
vation to detect deception. Each party must measure the consequences, or
outcomes, of the communicative situation. At this point, one must consider
what Michael McGee (1978) writes concerning political communication.
Ambiguous platform communication serves to condense complex political
data for the public. As McGee (1978) argues, although the public has been
conditioned to prefer "issue" politics, "image" politics are inescapable; the
public cannot make decisions on complex issues because, as McGee posits,
the public has neither the ability to process the necessary information, nor
the time to properly judge an issue. Ambiguity can please the public's ap-
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petite for participation, and by comparison platform communication should
not contain specific promises or plans of action when unity is at risk. In fact,
as McGee might argue, platforms should be constructed for images rather
than explanation of issues when taking into consideration the context of the
party and the complex issues of the time. The use of language without spe
cific promises or plans of action can be a mark of competent political com
munication that may be justified as being a helpful tool in justifiable context,
as Miller and Stiff might argue. The consequences of being ambiguous in
platforms seem to be less detrimental than being specific, something a can
didate must do after a platform helps bring factions together.
Such a conclusion may be regarded as an unusual statement because stra
tegic ambiguity is often viewed as antagonistic to the belief that communi
cation competence, especially in the political arena, is equated with clarity
and openness (Levine 1985). However, taking a similar stance as McGee,
Elder and Cobb (1983) agree with the notion that the public, for the most
part, does not make politics a major priority in life and dismiss or ignore
much political communication. Politicians need not always reveal complex
issues to a public that is usually unwilling to listen. Ambiguous messages
can serve to inform people and satisfy their basic needs for knowing without
turning them away with detailed information they usually do not want. Con
nelly (1987) goes as far to say that ambiguity in political communication
"keeps alive that which might otherwise be killed by the weight of authority
or necessity" (p. 141). One might argue that platforms contribute to the
identification process, but the candidate must then work on consubstantiality.
The choice of remaining unspecific in platforms does address the quality of
language in political communication, and this analysis reveals that such strat
egy may be justified when addressing pluralistic public with diverse needs
and opinions. Further research into platforms should attempt to, as Richard
Johannesen (1983) suggests, ". . . [help] formulate meaningful ethical guide
lines, not inflexible rules, for our communication behavior and for evaluating
the communication of others" (p. 9).
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THE "FAITH OF FRFFDOM" VS. THE FREEDOM
OF FAITH: EXPLORING THE TOTALITARIAN
DISCOURSE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER *
Omar Swartz
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
J. Edgar Hoover was director of the U.S. Bureau of Investigation from 1924
until his death in 1972. Under his leadership, the Bureau became interna
tionally known as an exemplary law enforcement agency. Paralleling the
success of the agency in fighting crime, however, there rose another side to
the federal police—a dark side that exemplifies limitations in American po
litical democracy.
In his capacity as director. Hoover received criticism for his relentless at
tack on social/political deviance that involved the severe repression of pop
ular dissent in this country (a dissent that is protected by the federal Consti
tution). This repression involved the harassment of civil rights leaders and
leaders of the anti-Vietnam War movement. In addition. Hoover authorized
the surveillance of outspoken Americans, generally, and he kept secret files
of people he considered to be enemies of the state. In other words. Hoover,
as leader of the highest law enforcement agency in the nation, sanctioned a
pervasive disregard for constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. "Even today
the extent of the F.B.I.'s illegal activity in the 1960s isn't fully recognized"
(1972, 206), remarks Hank Messic, one of Hoover's biographers.^
Hoover's political legacy may or may not involve systemic tendencies in
American law enforcement to use the legal system in a manner that exceeds
its legitimate authority; governmental abuse of American civil liberties may
have ended with the Nixon administration and Hoover's death. If that is the
case, this essay is merely a historical exercise, an example of an ideological
analysis, a small but necessary reminder of our inglorious political past. If
governmental abuse continues into the present, however, this essay takes on
a greater social significance by restating the important rhetorical observation
that totalitarian discourse can be recognized by certain language strategies
that persuaders use to gain support for otherwise unpopular and repressive
political positions. Given the current political environment, I suspect that this
political lesson continues to be relevant.
In this essay, I explore the totalitarian tendencies in Hoover's speech and
illustrate how his "Faith of Freedom" address (1965) is really a challenge to
the American potential of the freedom of faith. By "faith," I do not necessarily
mean faith in God; rather, by "faith" I refer to the freedom of faith that
* An earlier version of this essay was presented in the Public Address Division of
the 1993 Speech Communication Association Annual Convention in Miami.
' Government lawlessness is not limited to the national level. As Mark Zepezauer
(1994) documents, the Central Intelligence Agency has played a major role in prop
agating international terrorism and in subverting human rights around the globe. This
critique is extended by Chomsky and Herman (1979) and Zinn (1980).
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America promises to each of its citizens, a faith that its political system can
be modified and challenged to meet the growing needs of the people who
constitute American society. Hoover represents a challenge to that faith, by
substituting the freedom to debate and dissent, on the one hand, with a
political vision and climate of intolerance, of nationalism, of labor repres
sion, and of increased government domination of the American people, on
the other. In America, the freedom of faith is, first and foremost, the belief
that all Americans have the right to stand and voice what they believe and
to join with others in political discourse to effect directly conditions so as to
improve their lives. It is against this freedom that Hoover strikes, in the name
of the vengeful American God.
Ostensibly, Hoover's speech is about crime in America. As F.B.I, director.
Hoover should have had much to say about the topic of crime; yet, the
problem of crime is not the main concern of his speech. Hoover's discourse
is concerned with the accumulation and maintenance of power, both for
himself and for the government oligarchy for which he works. To support his
search for power, and to develop a legal infrastructure by which to prosecute
more effectively government dissenters. Hoover uses the excuse of the "Com
munist enemy" as a way of consolidating and legitimizing state repression.
In my analysis, I utilize the critical/theoretical framework of ideology devel
oped in Swartz (1997). In short, I argue that rhetorical scholars, by being
sensitive to what Edwin Black calls "the association between an idiom and
an ideology" (1970, 119), are in an excellent position to criticize the specific
relationships between ideology and language, and to produce studies that
serve as cultural interventions. Aiding me in this task is Gordon Allport's
psychological "programs," easily reconceptualized as rhetorical topoi, that
characterize language strategies among totalitarian discourse communities.
This paper has three main sections. In the first, I discuss what I call "the
totalitarianism topoi" or stock argumentative structures that totalitarian
speakers frequently employ. My purpose in doing so is to establish firmly
Hoover's totalitarian credentials. It is one thing to claim that political figures
who represent policies that are personally disliked are "totalitarian" or "fas
cist," especially when those people represent venerated American institu
tions. It is another thing, altogether, to offer strong arguments for the position.
This is especially pressing since labelling Hoover as a totalitarian speaker
has obvious political implications for understanding the U.S. government, a
political institution that professes norms of "democracy" and "equality." In
the second and third sections, I provide a more detailed ideological analysis
of Hoover's speech and describe his implied audience. My analysis provides
the subtext of the speech: the history, the assumptions, the ideological ma
nipulations that gave this speech a live and cultural resonance at the time at
which it was delivered.
Totalitarian Topoi
Hoover delivered the speech under analysis before the Freemason Su
preme Council on October 19, 1965. In many ways the Freemasons are an
ideal audience for Hoover's speech. Conservative and patriotic, this organi
zation represents the type of power structure Hoover supported and for
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which he spoke. For instance, The New Columbia Encyclopedia reports that
thirteen U.S. presidents have been Freemasons, and a large number of Con
gressional representatives have belonged to this order (1975, 1007). Given
his immediate audience, Hoover's speech was well situated in its expecta
tions; however, it would be a mistake to assume that the speech met its
primary audience on this occasion. Hoover's speech, after all, is a public
document. Hoover spoke as a high-level representative of the U.S. govern
ment. In a sense. Hoover was speaking to the nation. The words "the nation,"
however, are meaningless; there is no American nation outside of the dis
course that calls that nation into being with ideological significance (McGee,
1975). Hoover's larger audience, then, was rhetorical—yet rhetorical argu
ments do not exist outside of history. Thus, in a very real sense, the words
of his speech, the metaphors utilized, and the arguments positioned all ex
isted prior to that context and, most likely, continue to exist today (for ex
amples of these language strategies in other contexts see Casmir, 1966; Per
kins, 1948; Rosenfield, 1969; Raum and Measell, 1974§ewart, Smith, and
Denton, 1989; and Thompson, 1966).
Generally speaking, the above studies discuss totalitarian speakers, eluci
dating their strategies and appeal. My study of Hoover joins with them in a
further attempt to understand the totalitarian speaker. To gain a better un
derstanding of totalitarian rhetoric, we first need to understand the totalitar
ian persona more clearly and to examine how Hoover's discourse in the
speech under analysis situates his ideology within the totalitarian perspective.
Psychologist Gordon Allport (1954) aids us in this task.
In his landmark treatise on the nature of prejudice, Allport identifies the
totalitarian persona as one that believes in a society that is authoritative,
orderly, and nationalistic in nature (1954, 407). More specifically, Allport
lists a series of "programs" that delineate the authoritarian personality (1954,
414-16). These programs can be reinterpreted as the argumentative topoi of
the authoritarian speaker.^
The first program, or topoi, Allport lists is the feeling of being cheated. The
totalitarian feels insecure because other people Oews, Blacks, etc.) are un
fairly taking advantage of the "honest" folks. In this vein. Hoover commu
nicates a sense of national frustration;
In Europe and the Near East, our country's patience and determination are
constantly being strained by taunts and provocations of Iron Curtain slave
masters who talk of peace while clandestinely plotting to spread their godless
creed of utopia-in-chains (1965, 71).
Hoover suggests that U.S. economic interests abroad are threatened by the
spread of a Marxist consciousness. Overseas, American markets and labor
have fallen out of U.S. control. Thus, American business interests are, in a
sense, "cheated" out of their "rightful" resources.
The second topoi is the prevailing sense of a widespread conspiracy. Con
spiracy appeals are a functional tool in persuasion. By creating a perceived
threat, appeals to conspiracy argue for a new epistemology within a social
^ The topics, according to classical rhetoricians, are the "seats" of an argument,
stock positions that are used to generate lines of reasoning (Dick, 1964).
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community. As G. Thomas Goodnight and John Poulakos explain, "[a] theory
of conspiracy discourse must account for the possibility that those upholding
an unpopular or presumably lunatic point of view may be participating in
the restructuring of social consensus" (1981, 300). Totalitarian speakers pro
ject a view of the world as a dangerous place where civilized people are
threatened by irrational yet powerful forces. Hoover promotes this fear in his
discourse;
Communism is a vast international conspiracy which today dominates one-
third of the earth's people. Here in our own country, that conspiracy is rep
resented by the Communist Party, USA, a bold and defiant band of anti-
American turncoats whose operations are directed and controlled by the
Kremlin in Moscow (1965, 71).^
The third topoi is a threat of destruction at the hands of the enemy if
immediate preventative action is not taken. In this case, military action in
the Third World and the support of fascist dictatorships is justified:
Throughout Central and South America, we have had to erect guard posts of
freedom against the sinister efforts of communist henchmen to spread the
malignant cancer of Marxism across the Western Hemisphere (1965, 71)."
The fourth topoi is the lack of middle ground between divergent interest
groups. Hoover defines the world in black-and-white terms; he is the only
one who represents law and order and the "true" American faith. Any de
viance from his political doctrine is interpreted as a complete social up
heaval, anarchy in its negatively articulated sense; thus, other valid interests
are immediately denied.^ The "denied interest" has been identified by Philip
Wander (1984) as "the third persona." As Wander argues, "What is negated
through the Second Persona [the audience implied in a discourse] forms the
silhouette of a Third Persona—the 'it' that is not present, that is objectified
in a way that 'you' and 'I' are not" (1984, 209). In the case of Hoover, the
"it" missing from the discourse is the middle ground, the liberal persona that
abhors Stalinism as much as it abhors imperialism. In addition, the liberal
persona is typically one that believes in the American potential for economic
democracy and a wider commitment to civil rights and social equality. This
persona is clearly marginalized in Hoover's speech.
Hoover's Manichaean thinking is pervasive in the text. Communism is "a
dark world" devoid of truth, freedom, decency, and God (light). There is no
middle-ground as Hoover goads his audience into a primordial battle with
the devil. Hoover explains that "[wje must choose between law and anarchy,
freedom and chaos" (1965, 73). Nothing exists between the two conflicting
poles. Hoover sets up an unrealistic dichotomy, forcing his audience into his
camp by providing no alternatives between the two extremes.
The fifth topoi is the metamorphosis of the enemy into animality. In Hoov-
" For a more realistic appraisal of the situation described by Hoover's narrative, see
Klehr and Haynes (1992).
" For more context, see Chomsky (1985).
= Kropotkin (1995), the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century social theorist,
provides a comprehensive and more historically accurate discussion of anarchism
than the "anarchism" implied by Hoover to scare Americans into submission to state
authority.
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er's world, the Communists are "hordes" (1965, 71) and come from "the
jungle" (1965, 74) like wild animals. The reduction of the Communists to
base savagery is a vilifying act: by attributing a limited rational capacity and
a violent inhumanity to the Communists, Hoover magnifies the threat that
he wants to convey to his audience.
The sixth topoi involves a temporal urgency that leaves no time for hesi
tation and deliberation. The illness that is attacking Hoover's ideological
body is rapidly reaching a terminal stage. Hoover warns, "Today there is the
most urgent need for Americans to dedicate themselves to the strong moral
principles upon which our Nation was founded" (1965, 73). With this tactic,
Hoover's political audience is urged to seek solutions from a valorized past
to meet the challenge that Hoover creates. In a literal sense, however. Hoover
is privileging the ethical standards that were in effect nearly two hundred
years ago. Since the founding of the United States, there has been a signif
icant development in social and ethical awareness. Does Hoover imply that
the heightened social/ethical awareness should be rejected? Presumably,
Hoover's rejection includes forfeiting such "communist" tainted projects as
the abolishment of slavery, civil rights for women and minorities, social se
curity, the eight hour work day, and other privileges that go against the grain
of the "moral principles" of our nation's foundations. At the time of its found
ing, the United States of America was structured on the principles of class
privilege and racial inequality, not to mention its dedication to genocide and
expansionism (Zinn, 1980). The seventh topoi is the glorification of force. In
this case, the concept of "faith" takes on an aspect of aggression. Hoover
writes, "Faith is our mainstay in the ideological struggle now raging between
the camps of God-less communism and human freedom" (1965, 74). The
metaphor Hoover uses to describe the power of faith is that of the "fortress"
from which the true believer goes forth to do battle. Thus, Hoover justifies
the use of divinely sanctioned violence in order to fight Communism.
The eighth topoi is belief in a single party or governing system. For Hoover,
an authoritarian government would be ideal, but because he is a part of the
democratic establishment, however broadly we stretch the term, he faces
constraints in his ability to dismiss democratic dialectics. As a way of si
lencing opposition and achieving more power for his political authority and
for a government that often places itself outside or above popular politics.
Hoover blames the unknowing "intended victims" of the Communists for
aiding the Communist plot:
1 refer to the pseudollberals of the extreme left, as well as to the misguided
zealots of the ultra right—modern-day Don Quixotes who mistakenly fight
the transparent shadows of imaginary enemies rather than meet the challenge
of the real and awesome problems confronting our beloved United States
(1965, 72).
In this passage Hoover marginalizes all political views that oppose his own.
Furthermore, he mutes the champions of alternative positions by negating
their importance. Liberals become "pseudollberals" who fight false battles,
presumably the battles for racial integration, legalized abortion, social wel
fare, and the like. As for the "ultra right," I am not sure to whom he is
referring, as Hoover's language itself, by any reasonable standard, places him
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in that very category. By dissociating "real" from "imaginary" problems,
Hoover restricts the field of responses the nation has available to deal with
the social problems of the day.'' In other words, the political sphere has been
narrowed—acceptable politics is defined as Hoover's politics.
The ninth topoi is red-baiting. Allport explains how the totalitarian "indis
criminately labels all opponents as communists" (1954, 416); in doing so,
these speakers make themselves appear morally superior to those whom they
attack. Hoover uses red-baiting to justify his Constitutionally-strained law
enforcement tactics. As the Communist "menace" is so extreme, extreme
actions are justified in order to counter it.' As Noam Chompsky observes:
With broad liberal support, the Red Scare succeeded in undermining the
labor movement and dissident politics, and reinforcing corporate power. Two
lasting institutional developments from that period, of great consequence,
are the rise of the Public Relations industry, dedicated quite openly to con
trolling "the public mind," and the national political police (the F.B.I) (1988,
33).
In an important sense, the F.B.I.'s harassment of social movement leaders
becomes sanctioned as an extension of the international fight against Com
munism. Hoover claims that the Communists are training American youths
to help overthrow the U.S. government. To validate this "fact," Hoover points
to the political unrest among civil rights and anti-Vietnam War protesters as
instances of "Communist-inspired" agitation. Hoover concludes, "Already,
this fall, there are signs that those training sessions have begun to bear fruit—
in the form of defiant protests against law and authority" (1965, 72).
The last topoi is paranoia. Paranoia is perhaps the master topoi that ac
centuates the other nine strategies. Paranoia is an emotional reaction that
prevents rational discussion. It is a language strategy which takes "facts" out
of context and applies them to the orator's ends. In the following instance.
Hoover reinterprets college activism and its relationship to the university
establishment:
Today, as never before, the Communists are confident of their ability to win
recruits among this country's youth. That is why the party has placed such
intense emphasis upon its campus speech program—a program that has seen
skilled hucksters of atheism and treason appear at scores of colleges and
universities from New York to California, without objection by the authorities
of those institutions of higher learning and often with positive encouragement
by members of the faculties of such universities (1965, 72).
Notice the association of "atheism" with "treasons" by a man who is charged
by the public trust to protect our country. Treason is one of the more serious
charges that can be leveled against a citizen, although it seems to make little
sense to talk about "treason" outside of a military context. At any rate, if
"treason" is a crime, then it is literally Hoover's job to arrest the perpetra
tors—a scary thought when this man of the law associates "treason" with
''Originally discussed In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), an illustration of
"dissociation" in public argument can be found in Zarefsky, Tutzauer, and Tutzauer
(1984).
' For example, during the Iran-Contra hearings, Oliver North defended his unlawful
actions by claiming to protect the very Constitution he was actively subverting.
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"atheism" in a country that has a formal separation between Church and
State. This collapsing of the space between the religious and the political is
an important theme in the speech and it is discussed in greater detail in the
next section.
The above ten "programs" are not a definitive list of the totalitarian topoi,
nor does the list exhaust the examples of totalitarian argument in Hoover's
speech. What the list fundamentally does is to illustrate a resource of inven-
tional material that totalitarian speakers may draw upon in creating their
discourse. For example, scholars familiar with Nazi discourse recognize
many of these traits."
From the brief examples taken from Hoover's speech, I have shown that
each topoi can be found in Hoover's discourse. Now that I have established
a connection between Hoover and a totalitarian ideology, I turn, in the next
section, to a more detailed analysis of his speech, accentuating the relation
ship between his persona and the audience that such a personal implies.
This is especially important because totalitarian speakers need audiences,
and totalitarian discourse is still persuasion. The following criticism speaks
to this relationship.
Hoover's Persona and Its Implied Audience
In addition to meeting the parameters of the totalitarian personality as
outlined by Allport, Hoover's speech fits the paradigm that Edwin Black
(1970) offers of the Radical Right. Black explains that there is a common
topos among the Radical Right. These topoi serve as a reference point be
cause of their idiomatic nature, and they imply "that there are strong and
multifarious links between a style and an outlook" (1970, 119). Black's study
of the John Birch Society reveals that a common topos employs disease met
aphors, such as the cancer metaphor; the metaphors stress the need for im
mediate action and desperate medicine (1970, 115).
Utilizing a rhetoric similar to the rhetoric of the John Birch Society, Hoover
presents a diseased, assaulted, and violated America that is torn from within
by weakness (civil-liberty), and threatened from without by "Communist
hordes" (1965, 71). The governing constructs of Law, Order, and God from
the classical heritage of America are being openly assaulted by the "godless
creed of utopia-in-chains" (1965, 71). Hoover reminds his audience that the
current conditions equal a state of disease. Similar to the doctor who pre
scribes chemotherapy in a last ditch effort to ward off a patient's cancer.
Hoover argues that the nation's ideological health is in need of desperate
and immediate medicine: inertness serves only the interest of the enemy.
A "free nation," one under siege, needs a "fortress" and that fortress is,
according to Hoover, "Faith in God" (1965, 74). However, it is a specific
God, and a specific freedom, that Hoover exalts. Hoover has deposited a
persuasive definition whereby he retains the connotative sense of popular
references to God (the Universal Being) but substitutes a different referent
"The following studies explore, in some fashion, this topical pattern in Nazi dis
course: Bosmajian (1965); Bosmajian (1960); Bosmajian (1974); Delia (1971); Scan-
Ian, (1951); and Wilkie, (1966).
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(patriotic Christianity), which is unnoticed (or under-noticed) by his audi
ence. Persuasive definitions are defined by Charles L. Stevenson, who ex
plains: The purport of the definition is to alter the descriptive meaning of the
term, usually by giving it greater precision within the boundaries of its cus
tomary vagueness; but the definition does not make any substantial change
in the terms' emotive meaning. (1944, 210) Hoover limits his evoked God,
and the freedom to worship that God, to what I call "the God of George
Washington." The God of George Washington is what the founders of this
nation had in mind when they evoked a divine spirit in the Declaration of
Independence, U.S. Constitution, and the Pledge of Allegiance—documents
(and deities) created to serve the interests of the white colonists, and not of
the African slave or Native American. Hoover is up in arms because the God
of Washington is under siege by another God, one of political liberty and
economic justice. Due to the threat to his God, Hoover seeks to erect a
"fortress" so that the ideologies of other faiths can be kept from interfering
with the rule of Washington's God. The "Faith of Freedom," then, is the faith
in a specific God whose adherents have dug into the trenches for a long
territorial fight. Hoover celebrates this particular and exclusive faith while
the warriors of this faith fight and die, and the leaders supplicate themselves
to the ideology that "dominated the atmosphere at Independence Hall, Phil
adelphia when the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were
framed" (1965, 74). Meanwhile, Hoover excludes the freedom of faith, that
is, the freedom to imagine a better life, while privileging the "faith of free
dom," or subservience to the status quo.
The distinction between the "faith of freedom" and the freedom of faith
is central to understanding Hoover's totalitarian persona and the persona of
his implied audience. The "faith of freedom" implies an autocracy, while the
freedom of faith is democratic in nature. To gain a clearer understanding of
the politics implied in Hoover's world view, consider his following remarks:
"[Fjaith remains our strongest bulwark against the criminal and subversive
enemies who would destroy our priceless heritage of liberty and justice for
all" (74). The all-encompassing ideographs "liberty" and "justice" are mis
nomers."' Ostensibly, the two reflect a democratic politics; however, since
Hoover privileges a faith specific to a particular brand of patriotic Christi
anity, the range of Hoover's polis is severely limited.
As a result of the narrowing of the acceptable political field, the justice
that derives from his concept of faith is ideologically mediated. This is par
ticularly clear as Hoover discusses "crime and immorality" (1965, 73) in a
single breath, as if they were one and the same. In a democratic and secular
society, such as what the United States purports to be, a person is free, in
fact, even encouraged in many ways, to be immoral; laws, for the most part
do not directly govern value-orientations (such as greed, for example). In
theory, a person's character is not subject to legislation; the de-criminaliza-
tion of homosexuality is based upon this principle. While this ideal separa
tion between law and morality is not always maintained in our society, it is
beside the point: in Hoover's discourse, the two are completely collapsed.
Under the justice of the God of Washington, crime and immorality are one
' See McGee (1980) for a discussion of ideographs in public argumentation.
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and the same. This is another example of Hoover's use of a persuasive def
inition; he takes a common value, "justice," and assigns to it an uncommon
referent, "aristocratic justice," as opposed to "utilitarian justice" or an equal
ity that mediates across social-economic and cultural boundaries.
By collapsing the moral with the legal. Hoover subjugates his audience to
his persona as a priest/prophet/crusader—calling the faithful to arms against
the heathens. He asks his audience to join a sacred crusade to protect the
American Holy Land and to reassert the full dominance of America's ideo
logical supremacy. In so doing. Hoover evokes an audience that has its roots
in colonial America with "the brave patriots" of Valley Forge, grounding his
audience in the myth represented by the so-called Golden Age of America.
This myth is exemplified in the figure of George Washington:
George Washington, the Father of our Country, was a master Mason—a
statesman of greatest courage and dedication who envisioned America as a
land where men of all creeds might live together and worship together in
freedom under God (1965, 71).
In his mythical reconstruction of American history. Hoover presents a radi
cally selective narrative. For instance, he neglects to mention the forced con
scription of soldiers into Washington's army. Conscription, by itself, is not
necessarily damning of a young country struggling for its survival. What is
alarming for people critical of Hoover's persona and the audience it implies
in American politics are the reasons why the common soldier did not ap
preciate Washington's "courage" and "dedication."
As historian Howard Zinn argues, the average American did not want to
serve the economic interests of the power-elite that started and benefitted
from the War for Independence. In lending evidence to his argument, Zinn
documents the conditions of the average soldier during the American Rev
olution. First, "general enthusiasm for the war was not strong" (1980, 76).
Second, conscription of the poor was the norm (1980, 78). Third, army dis
cipline, which included lashings and executions, were frequent, as were
mutinies and rebellions (1980, 78-80). Last, Zinn documents the merchant
and ruling class origins of the revolution: "George Washington was the
richest man in America. John Hancock was a prosperous Boston merchant.
Benjamin Franklin was a wealthy printer" (1980, 84). More importantly, how
ever, Hoover does not accurately represent Washington's "America"—there
is no mention of slavery, of the rigid class structure of indentured servants,
or of the genocide of the Native Americans. Instead, Hoover presents a myth
ic scene of America's "abiding faith in man's ability to guide his own destiny
with the help of God" (1965, 71).
In an important sense. Hoover sanctions inequality by substituting a his
torical consciousness for a ahistorical transcendence to God. If God guides
the destiny of humans, then the material world is simply a manifestation of
the spiritual world, the status quo is thus reified. In addition. Hoover neglects
to mention that "man" was taken literally to mean the biological male, and
not "human beings"—a broader, more encompassing construct that recog
nizes women as political entities. The "man" that Hoover appeals to is even
more limited than in a gendered sense: the concept of "man" denoted both
whiteness and wealth. In their study of the expatriation of African-Americans,
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Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites illustrate that membership
in the class of "man" was "interpolated by the Anglo-American who shared
religion, values, and customs, in addition to language and daily habits" (12).
In other words, the eighteenth and nineteenth century concept of "man" was
interpreted as a specific "people" in terms of cultural communities. African-
Americans, Native Americans, the landless, and working classes were sys
tematically excluded from these communities and were still excluded, in
many real senses, at the time that Hoover delivered his speech.
A member of the audience that Hoover constructs can sense (along with
the rest of us, but in a less-than-positive light) the nostalgic undertones and
rhetorical appeals that Hoover cultivates in order to perpetuate his myth.
Perhaps the musical score of John Phillips Sousa can be heard amidst the
background of Hoover's narrative (as a subtext) and "Old Glory" can be seen
raised against a cloudless blue sky. This is the narrative of America as it was
in a mythical past, and the America as it ought to be in Hoover's mythical
future. The America of the present, however, is different, and Hoover's nar
ration reflects this divergence.
In the present, as Hoover would lead us to believe in his rhetorical subtext,
the ruthless screams of millions acting in brainwashed unity shatter the tran-
quility of the classical myth. The blue sky of Hoover's idealized past becomes
clouded and stormy. Soot from the charred flag litters the ground and mixes
with the scattered bodies of young children, violated and torn apart by Marx
ist bullets, their Sunday clothes spoiled by blood; the town church burns
with its Bibles. These images come from Hoover's narration and can only be
read from the perspective of an audience ignorant of U.S. history and of the
political reality that defines a Communist ideology. Comprising a subtext,
they lie parallel to, but just outside the actual text. Wander sanctions such
a reading by explaining that "texts and events not mentioned in the text may
be linked" (1984, 207). This linkage arises when critics make an "ideological
turn" and recognize the conflicting interests that become posited in every
text (Wander, 1983). In linking ideas to text, the ideological critic names the
implications that a discourse has or could have on an audience.
Contrast the images of Hoover's subtext with those of the actual text, and
the congruence between the two is clear:
Today, our priceless heritage of freedom is under relentless attack both at
home and abroad. In the jungles and rice fields of southeast Asia, Americans
in uniform maintain a constant vigil against the communist hordes of a mod
ern day Genghis Kahn to whom no commodity is cheaper than human life
(1965, 71).
For an audience that falls outside the parameters of Hoover's implied audi
ence, the argument is childish and the metaphors absurd; little in that pre
vious fragment from Hoover's speech has any referent for an audience mem
ber to grasp and analyze as part of a rational discourse. Rational people
would condemn this speaker, as I am doing now; yet Hoover had power,
and part of that power was grounded in the fact that people accepted his
oratory. But why? Was it the fact that he had a comprehensive narrative? In
the above example alone, the reader can find an inclusive Weltanschauung
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of ideology and myth.'° Was Hoover successful because we, as human be
ings, like simplistic, but complete stories? Or was it the particular story he
told—a totalitarian story of hate and fear to which many Americans reso
nated? Are we that kind of people?
Explicating Hoover's Argument: The Quest For Power
In the above passage. Hoover contrasts the phrase "priceless heritage of
freedom," a string of four positively infused and emotive words, with a string
of roughly forty words that are negatively infused and equally emotive. The
God-term, "freedom," is in this instance literally surrounded and overpow
ered by a host of Devil-terms. As this polarity suggests, "God" and "Devil"
terms represent ultimate ideological positions within a discourse and speak
er's world view: they announce and demarcate a dialectical tension between
the extremes of good and evil (Weaver, 1953). In accentuating this dialectical
tension. Hoover illustrates how his concept of "freedom" is under "relent
less" attack and is threatened with ideological annihilation.
Hoover argues that the God of Washington is besieged in the Third World.
He ignores the obvious question of how the God of Washington can be
attacked overseas when the domain of this God is the United States. The
God of Washington cannot be attacked abroad unless some unwelcomed
manifestation or influence of this God is overseas. Thus, the God that rose
out of the original U.S. colonies and manifested itself during the War for
Independence has now become the God of U.S. imperialism in the Third
World. The presence of this force in Southeast Asia did not raise any ques
tions for Hoover and his implied audience; the hegemonic impulses of their
ideology appear natural. For Hoover and his implied audience, the God of
Washington is the only True God; all the other Gods or ideologies are false,
perverse.
Now that Hoover has established the primacy of his God, and illustrated
that this God is being threatened, it becomes important to delineate the
attackers. The threat stems from the Communists, a sub-human race of beasts
who come from jungles and rice fields like animals, not from cities, shop
ping-malls, TV. studios, or universities, the proper domains of "civilized"
people. The agents of this upheaval are dehumanized which makes them all
the more menacing. Confronting the Communists are American soldiers "in
uniform"; presumably the ill-equipped Communists do not have uniforms.
Uniforms denote civilized fighters, respectable people, a professional army.
In brutal contrast, the Communists are armed hoodlums. The American sol
diers are portrayed as standing "vigil" against the Communists, a religious
metaphor signifying that the American "protectors" are serving in the name
of Washington's God. Sadly, these soldiers are going to be slaughtered be
cause they face "hordes" of animals who show no restraint in perpetrating
violence.
In terms suggested In another context by Fisher, elaboratlve myths function to
Insure that a strong "narrative probability" and a high "narrative fidelity" are main
tained within the particular Ideological constraints of an audience. Fisher explains
that narrative probability and narrative fidelity denote coherency and bellevablllty In
an argument (1984, 8).
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The Communist "hordes" literally represent an incarnation of Genghis
Kahn, a figure from distant history who represents the extreme of baneful
aggression. Why did Hoover not compare the Communists to Hitler, a much
more vivid and archetypal evil? Hoover could not choose Hitler because
Hitler is too similar to himself and his audience. Hitler was a man of this
century, thus allegedly part of the modern paradigm of rationality. In some
sense. Hitler was "Christian," like those who serve the God of Washington.
Similar to Hoover and others of his ilk. Hitler led a Christian nation by
perverting the basic tenets of Christianity, while retaining the pretense of its
virtues (Burke, 1973 [1941], 219).
Two examples illustrate the above point. First, Hitler's honorific title. Fueh
rer, means "guide," in a quasi-messianic sense of one's having knowledge
of a higher, heavenly truth. Hitler presented himself as anointed by God with
the responsibility and sanction to lead the German nation. Second, Hitler
made fundamental Christian appeals in promoting his agenda of genocide
as the following passage from Mein Kampf illustrates: "Hence today I believe
that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by
defending myself against the jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord"
(emphasis his, 65). In addition. Hitler abided by the rules of war in treating
captured American soldiers. Genghis Kahn, on the other hand, is seen as a
beast from the past, an irrational killing machine. Kahn, therefore, is a con
venient referent with which to associate the Communists. In the idiom of
American politics—at least according to Hoover and a nation that believes
in his reasoning—Communism is worse than Nazism (a point that is a trav
esty of historical consciousness).
Hoover's narrative continues to contrast America's moral superiority with
the plague-like infestation of immoral Communism. The Communists are
"henchmen" spreading "malignant cancer." Their "treachery" is only coun
tered by "fast action taken by a courageous president and alert Americans"
(1965, 71). "Fast" and "alert" are adjectives that do not denote contempla
tion, mediation, discussion, or democratic dialectic. No citizen wants to self-
identify as an "unalert" American. However, the thinking and questioning
individual—as opposed to the passive and obedient one—is positioned by
Hoover as being "unalert." Discussion and criticism, by preventing action
designed to defend American ideology, serve as tools of the enemy.
During the early sections of the speech, the narrative is concerned with
the Golden Age of America and the dark threat from Asia. Yet, as discussed
in the background section of this paper, the real focus of this speech is
power—both institutional and individual. Hoover's quest for more power as
director of the F.B.I., as well as his larger quest for authority and control on
behalf of the government, begins in the eighth paragraph. Here, he moves
from the international threat (the Cold War) to the domestic threat (civil
unrest). Hoover defines the domestic threat as originating from the the Com
munist F^arty of America, whose members are "bold" and "defiant" "turn
coats" who represent a "foreign" enemy "outpost" on sovereign soil (1965,
72). The reduction of all U.S. dissidence to mythical origins in Communism
is evident in the following quotation, in which Hoover transforms a common
antiwar demonstrator into a Communist agitator:
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In the State of Washington, one Communist speaker loudly condemned the
United States for Its actions In helping to defend the cause of freedom In the
Far East. He charged his audience that It was their duty to demand Immediate
withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam (1965, 72).
By blaming American social unrest on Communism, and associating Com
munism with the horrors and evils that he outlines in the first part of his
speech. Hoover undermines the legal rights of protestors who seek to express
grievances about governmental or social policy. In effect. Hoover moves this
country closer to a totalitarian model that benefits him personally as head
of the federal police. In addition, this social model benefits the status quo
(in particular business and industry, traditional supporters of fascism) by pro
viding internal stability in this county and a dependable cheap labor force.
Another example of linking deviance with Communism is Hoover's attack
of civil disobedience as "a seditious slogan of gross irresponsibility [that] has
captured the imagination of citizens who are morally, mentally, and emo
tionally immature" (1965, 72). Hoover is specifically addressing his com
ments to the civil rights movement and its leaders who encourage people to
disobey "unjust" laws. This appalls Hoover who, as an authoritarian, main
tains, "The citizen has no latitude as to what laws he must obey" (1965, 72).
Hoover's condemnation of civil unrest leads to his discussion of crime. He
calls attention to the polarity between "law" and "anarchy" by placing civil
disobedience in Marxist-inspired anarchy. According to Hoover, political dis
sent creates social unrest; this state leads to crime and to the breakdown of
society. Inevitably, this condition leads civilization to a jungle-like existence.
Hoover's implicit argument is that without God, humans degenerate into
beasts, which is why faith is central to his world view.
In his specific discussion of crime. Hoover complains of leniency in the
judicial system, which he causally connects to anarchy and the killing of
police officers. More specifically, Hoover's argument can be reconstructed
in the following way. First, civil liberty implies the freedom to worship Gods
other than the God of Washington. Second, these other Gods tend to be
Marxist. Third, the less civil liberty, the more power Hoover, as F.B.I, director,
has in fighting Communism in America. This means, in effect, that popular
dissent on real social issues involving racism, poverty, and war will be mar
ginalized from the public sphere. Hoover's conclusion is that civil liberty,
while appropriate in theory, serves to the advantage of America's Communist
enemies. He explains, "Certainly civil rights and individual dignity have their
vital place in life, but what about the common good and the law and order
that preserve us from lapsing back into the jungle?" (1965, 74). In other
words, as the "jungle" must constantly be kept at bay, "civil rights" and
"individual dignity" have no role to play in Hoover's political world.
Hoover makes it clear that lawlessness is the result of Communist agitation,
as opposed to more systemic problems in our culture. Furthermore, this Com
munism has been tolerated for too long under the American commitment to
civil liberty. According to Hoover, the reason police are being killed in Amer
ica is because there is a lack of law and order. In order to regain control of
the country from the criminal agitators, Hoover advocates the suspension of
civil liberty. He reasons that such suspension is necessary in order to imple
ment more efficient law enforcement. In short, Hoover's thesis is that "We
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must have a world ruled by law" (1965, 74). Hoover grounds his law in the
"fortress" of "faith" and the ideological privilege of Washington's Cod. This
fortress is a prison for those outside the privileged faith that rules from within.
Conclusion
Hoover's text may be considered an extreme and obvious example of ideo
logically-saturated oratory. Furthermore, it may be equally obvious that Hoo
ver was an excessively dogmatic and paranoid figure in recent American
history. However, the fact that Hoover wielded power for almost fifty years
as director of the F.B.I, suggests that it would be unwise to take his discourse
for granted. The example of Hoover commands the attention of critics to
study carefully the social reality that he symbolically created. In recognizing
the rhetorical strategies Hoover utilized to promote his ideological agenda,
in particular the "totalitarian topoi," students of rhetoric may gain critical
strength in their ability to confront totalitarian speakers in the future.
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